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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Institutions Governing Marriage and Outcomes over the Life Cycle
by
Sounak Thakur
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Professor Marcus Berliant, Chair
In this thesis, I study how institutions that govern marriage can affect marital choices and
economic decisionmaking within marriage. The institutions that I study encompass both formal institutions, like laws that govern family formation, or more informal ones, like customs
mandating the amount and direction of transfers at marriage or the level of commitment within
marriage. This thesis consists of three chapters, and each chapter tackles a specific research
problem under the broad research agenda.
In the first chapter of my thesis, I study how changes in divorce and property division laws
affect the rates of marriage formation, marital sorting patterns, and decisions within marriage
such as asset accumulation and divorce. Through the 1970s and 80s, many states in the United
States enacted changes to their divorce and property division laws. While divorce laws changed
from mutual consent to unilateral, property division laws in the event of divorce changed from
title-based to equitable division, favoring the low-income earner in property settlements. From
the high income earner’s point of view, equitable division acts as a tax on asset accumulation
within marriage, reducing the incentive to marry. To quantify the effect of these legal changes,
I embed a dynamic collective model of marriage with endogenous asset accumulation, labor
supply and divorce into a frictionless marriage-matching model. I estimate the model using
data from marriages under a mutual consent, equitable division regime and simulate behavior
under other legal regimes. I find that equitable division laws reduce the rate of marriage, and
account for 18% of the long-term decline in the rate of marriage in the United States. Moreover,
consistent with the data, equitable division laws reduce the rates of asset accumulation, female
labor force participation and divorce. Further, both unilateral divorce and equitable division
laws lead to substantial losses in economic efficiency.
viii

In the second chapter of my thesis, I study the effect of norms governing marital transfers on
intrahousehold allocation of resources, and the implications thereof on the nutritional outcomes
of children. in India, which serves as the setting for the research in this chapter, daughters’
weddings are very expensive and severely constrain the household budget in poor families. In
such households, saving for marriage expenses could crowd out resources for the purchase of
food, thus affecting children’s nutritional outcomes. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find
that the presence of an additional unmarried daughter is associated with a greater deterioration
in children’s nutrition amongst caste groups that, by custom, are obligated to incur higher
marriage expenses. Given that early childhood nutrition correlates with later life outcomes,
high marriage expenses could adversely affect economic outcomes in adulthood.
In the final chapter of my thesis, we (my co-author and thesis supervisor, Marcus Berliant,
and I) study the role of commitment within marriage on the welfare properties of the marriage
market equilibrium. We observe that the set of stable marriage matches is different depending on whether allocation within marriage is determined by binding agreements in the marriage market (BAMM) or by bargaining in marriage (BIM). With transferable utility, any stable
matching is utilitarian efficient under BAMM, but not under BIM. Is it possible to implement
the efficient matching under BIM? We show that if one side of the market is sufficiently sensitive relative to the other, if the more sensitive side can be ranked by sensitivity, and if their
preferences are hierarchical, the top trading cycles algorithm results in an efficient matching.
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Chapter 1
Family Law, Marriage, and Household
Decisions
1.1

Introduction

Over the latter half of the past century, the United States, like much of the developed world,
experienced a decrease in the rate of marriage and an increase in the rate of divorce (see Figures
1.1 & 1.2). These long-term trends are of interest to economists because they affect welfare,
both of adults and of young children, a larger fraction of whom now grow up in less stable (and
blended) families — living arrangements that correlate with worse outcomes for children (see
Ginther & Pollak (2004)).
In this paper, I quantify the extent to which changes in divorce and property division laws
contributed to these long-term trends, i.e., the decrease in the rate of marriage and the increase
in the rate of divorce, and affected economic welfare. To be more specific, I study how these
legal changes affected rates of marriage formation, marital sorting patterns (i.e., who marries
whom), and decisions within marriage such as asset accumulation and divorce; and quantify
changes in welfare, as viewed through the lenses of efficiency and distribution.
Beginning in the late 1960s and through the 1980s, a large number of states in the United
States changed their divorce laws from a mutual consent to a unilateral divorce regime. Unlike
mutual consent divorce laws, unilateral divorce laws allow any spouse to obtain divorce without
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the consent of the other. Contemporaneously, many states also changed their laws governing the
division of marital property in the event of divorce from a title-based to an equitable division
regime. In contrast to title-based statutes that provide for the division of marital property in
accordance with property titles, equitable division laws mandate that a judge decide on a fair
division of marital property in the event of divorce, usually favoring the low-income earner in
property settlements. From the high income earner’s point of view, equitable division acts as a
tax on asset accumulation within marriage, reducing incentives to marry and accumulate assets
within marriage.
With a view to studying how marriage decisions and behaviors within marriage change in
response to changes in divorce and property division laws, I formulate a dynamic collective
model of marriage with endogenous asset accumulation, labor supply and divorce. I embed the
model of the collective household in a frictionless empirical marriage-matching model. In the
model, individuals enter the marriage market with pre-determined levels of human capital, and
match with individuals of the opposite gender, agreeing on spousal decision weights applicable
to the problem of the collective household.
In order to quantify the effect of the legal changes, I estimate parameters of the model by
targeting data from marriages under a mutual consent, equitable division regime, and simulate
behavior under the other three legal regimes, namely, mutual consent, title-based; unilateral,
title-based; and unilateral, equitable. I find that divorce and property division laws affect the
rate of marriage and divorce but do not affect the rate of assortative matching. The introduction
of equitable division in any divorce law regime reduces the rate of marriage, and accounts
for about 18% of the long-term decline in the rate of marriage. The rate of divorce decreases
when equitable division laws are introduced, but increases with the introduction of unilateral
divorce laws. Overall, the change in legal regime from mutual consent, title-based to unilateral,
equitable accounts for only about 11% of the long-term increase in the rate of divorce. Further,
equitable division reduces the rate of asset accumulation within marriage in any divorce law
regime. Finally, I conduct a welfare comparison of different legal regimes, and find that both
unilateral divorce and equitable division laws lead to a substantial loss in economic efficiency.
The model sheds light on key mechanisms through which the changes in divorce and prop-
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erty division laws affect marriage decisions on the intensive and extensive margins. For instance, a high income earner would be less willing to marry a low-income earner in an unilateral divorce, equitable division regime than in a mutual consent, title-based regime. This is
on account of the fact that in a unilateral divorce, equitable division regime, the high income
earner knows that if the marriage does not work out, the low-earning spouse can unilaterally
quit the marriage with half the marital property, to which the high-earning spouse would have
principally contributed. This channel tends to increase assortative matching. However, equitable division distorts the high-income earner’s incentives to save within marriage, thereby
reducing the gains from marriage. This channel tends to cause high income earners, typically
men, not to marry. With fewer men willing to marry, the splits of marital surplus accruing to
men rise, causing some women to remain single, in turn affecting the splits of marital surplus
negotiated in the marriage market and marital sorting. Given the complex general equilibrium
effects at play, the effects on marital sorting are ambiguous. My simulations indicate that the
introduction of equitable division changes behaviors at the extensive (marriage) margin, but
leaves the intensive (marriage) margin unaffected. Moreover, the divorce and property division
laws alter the splits of marital surplus negotiated in the marriage market, causing marriages to
behave differently in different legal regimes.
This paper is closely related to a large strand of literature that investigates the effects of
change in divorce and property division laws, on family formation, decisions within marriage,
and divorce, both in the U.S. and European contexts. The behaviors studied by previous literature include divorce rates (see Allen (1992), Peters (1992), Friedberg (1998), Wolfers (2006),
González & Viitanen (2009)), rates of marriage formation (see Rasul (2003), Matouschek
& Rasul (2008)), asset accumulation (see Stevenson (2007)), female labor supply (see Gray
(1998), Chiappori et al. (2002) and Voena (2015)), rates of violent crime (see Cáceres-Delpiano
& Giolito (2012)), spousal homicide and suicide rates (see Stevenson & Wolfers (2006)), the
welfare of children (see Gruber (2004)) and college educational attainment (see Blair & Neilson
(2018)). Further, Voena (2015) studies the effects of changes in divorce and property division
laws on couples who married before the legal changes, and finds that female labor force participation decreased and asset accumulation increased after the introduction of unilateral divorce
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and equitable division. In a recent paper, Fernández & Wong (2017) conduct a welfare analysis
of divorce law regimes, assuming equal property division in the event of divorce. Finally, in a
paper related very closely to the research in this paper, Reynoso (2019) extends the literature
by studying the effect of change in divorce laws on marriage decisions and behavior within
marriage.
This paper contributes to the literature by enhancing the understanding of the long-term
consequences of changes in divorce and property division laws in the following three ways.
First, this paper quantifies the effect of changes in divorce and property division laws on marriage and divorce rates in the long-run. I find that equitable division laws can account for 18%
of the long-term decline in the rate of marriage. Second, this paper allows for endogenous
marital choice, and finds that the introduction of equitable division leads to a reduction in the
rate of asset accumulation. This stands in contrast to the findings in the existing literature (see
Voena (2015)), which suggests that equitable division laws increase the rate of accumulation,
if the marriage decisions are not allowed to endogenously respond to changes in property division laws. Third, this paper quantifies how changes in divorce and property division laws affect
welfare.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the institutional background of changes in divorce and property division laws. Section 1.3 details the
model. Section 1.4 describes the dataset and the estimation methodology. Section 1.5 presents
results of simulating the model with estimated parameter values for different legal regimes, and
their welfare implications. Section 1.6 concludes.

1.2

Institutional Background of Legal Changes

Traditional family law in the United States, drawing upon the British legal tradition that was
heavily influenced by Christian religious principles, treated marriage as a sacrament consisting in a commitment between a man and a woman to join one another for life.1 However,
by 1900 all states in the United States permitted divorce on “fault-based” grounds. Amongst
1

The actual marital vow was a promise “to take each other to love and to cherish, in sickness and in health, for
better, for worse, until death do us part” (see Weitzman (1985), page 1).
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the commonly accepted grounds for divorce were instances of marital fault such as adultery,
cruelty (physical or mental) and desertion. Starting in the 1920s different states in the United
States changed their divorce laws to include a “no-fault” ground for divorce. In most cases
this new ground was termed “irretrievable breakdown” of marriage. Thus, under the no-fault
statutes, the law expressly permitted divorce by mutual consent even though there was no claim
or evidence of wrongdoing on either side. Beginning in the late 1960s and through the 1980s,
many states in the United States enacted further changes to their divorce laws, instituting divorce statutes that came to be known as “unilateral” divorce. In such a legal regime, any one
spouse, acting on her/his own and without the consent of her/his partner, could obtain a divorce. Further, in a unilateral divorce regime, a spouse did not need to establish “marital fault”
on part of her/his partner as a pre-condition for divorce. Figure 1.3 shows how the proportion of
states with unilateral divorce statutes changed between 1965 and 1992. Note that the fraction
of states with unilateral divorce increased rapidly in the early 1970s. Adoption of unilateral
divorce continued through the late 1970s and 1980s, albeit at a slower pace.
In this paper, I follow the existing economic literature (see Gruber (2004), Voena (2015),
Reynoso (2019)) and classify divorce law regimes into two broad categories, namely, mutual
consent and unilateral divorce regimes. Thus, the mutual consent regime encompasses legal
regimes that allowed divorce only on grounds of marital fault and those that allowed divorce on
grounds of either marital fault or irretrievable breakdown of marriage, subject to the condition
that both spouses agreed that there had been an “irretrievable breakdown” of marriage. The
rationale for classifying these two legal regimes as mutual consent is that even in a fault-based
regime, a divorce by mutual consent was possible. If both spouses wanted divorce, one spouse
could falsely accuse the other of having committed some “fault” and the spouse accused could
simply choose not to contest the allegations during divorce proceedings.2 In fact, such acts of
perjury were so common that their prevention appears to have been a major motivation for the
enactment of no-fault statutes.
2

This seems to have been fairly common under fault-based statutes. Weitzman (1985)(pg. 8) writes, “Over
time, in actual practice, many divorcing couples privately agreed to an uncontested divorce whereby one party,
usually the wife, would take the pro forma role of the innocent plaintiff. Supported by witnesses, she would attest
to her husband’s cruel conduct and he would not challenge her allegations.” In such cases, a divorce would be
granted under the law.
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The laws regarding division of marital property in the event of divorce varied across states.
By the middle of the twentieth century, there were three distinct property division regimes,
namely, title-based, equitable division and community property. As of 1967, thirty states followed a title-based property division regime which mandated that in the event of divorce, marital property be divided in accordance with the property titles held by each spouse. In contrast,
eight states, mostly with a Spanish or French historical legacy, followed the community property regime, under which marital assets were equally divided between the ex-spouses. The
remaining thirteen states followed an equitable division regime, in which the judge adjudicating divorce decided on the fair share of marital property between the ex-spouses. Through the
1970s and the 1980s, a large number of states that had title-based property division changed
their laws to institute equitable division property regimes. In contrast, states that already had
equitable division or community property did not change their property division laws. Figure 1.3 shows how the fraction of states that had equitable division laws increased over time.
Further, Table A1 provides the dates of change in both divorce and property division laws.

1.3

The Model

1.3.1

An Outline

Every individual in the economy is either female or male and has either high education or low
education. The highly(low) educated individuals are potential high(low) income earners, ie,
they earn a higher(lower) wage if they work over their life cycle. The number of individuals in
each education category and gender and their wages over the life cycle are exogenously given
and are common knowledge. Each individual knows the current divorce and property division
laws, and expects the same laws to persist through her/his lifetime.
The life of any individual consists of two stages. In the first stage, each individual must
decide whether to marry or to remain unmarried. Individuals who marry must also decide the
type of partner to marry. While making marital choices individuals factor in both economic
and non-economic considerations. The economic gains from marriage consist in consumption
economies of scale available exclusively to married couples. The non-economic gains from
6

marriage, or “love” is modeled as a taste-for-partner shock. Each person draws a taste shock
for each type partner of the opposite sex. They then match with members of the opposite sex
in a frictionless marriage market. Matches are made and some individuals could remain single. In each type of marital pairing3 , a contract regarding the split of the marital surplus is
negotiated on the marriage market. Once the matches have been made, the marriage market
closes. No further matches can be made thereafter. Married couples and unmarried individuals
start living their lives. Over the course of their lives, couples may divorce, but divorcees are not
allowed to remarry. This sequence of events is succinctly depicted in the timeline drawn below:
0
Matching

1

T

2

Married or unmarried life

Individuals enter their adult lives either as an unmarried person or as a spouse in a married couple. The behavior of married couples is modeled using a dynamic extension of the
collective model of the household (à la Voena (2015))4 . This stage lasts for T periods. At the
beginning of each period except the last, each spouse in a marriage draws a “distaste-for-work”
shock. Having observed the values of the shock, the couple makes labor supply, savings and
consumption allocation decisions.
At the end of each period except the last, each spouse draws a “taste-for-partner” shock,
which evolves as a random walk stochastic process. Based on the realizations of this shock,
the couple decides whether to enter the next period married or to divorce. The legal regime,
which agents take as given and expect to persist through their lives,5 enters into the problem
of married individuals in two ways. The divorce law regime affects conditions under which
divorce may be obtained while the property division regime affects the division of property in
the event of divorce.
In a mutual consent regime, divorce requires the consent of both spouses. So, if there is
3

There are four types of marital pairing, namely, {HighM an, HighW oman}, {HighM an, LowW oman},
{LowM an, HighW oman} and {LowM an, LowW oman}
4
The original static versions of the collective model can be found in Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992).
5
While pre-nuptial agreements might allow a couple to contract out of the existing legal regime, they were
not consistently enforced until the Uniform Prenuptial Agreements Act 1983 (see Voena (2015)). Moreover,
prenuptial agreements remain rare even today (see Mahar (2003)).
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a disagreement between the husband and the wife regarding whether to divorce or to remain
married, the spouse who wants to divorce could attempt to transfer a share of her marital assets
to the spouse who wants to stay married so as to make her indifferent between getting divorced
and staying married. By contrast, in a unilateral divorce regime, marriage, rather than divorce,
requires the consent of both spouses. Hence, if there is a disagreement between the husband
and the wife regarding whether to divorce or to remain married, the split of marital surplus
contracted in the previous period might be re-negotiated so as to make the spouse requesting
divorce indifferent between remaining married and getting divorced. It bears emphasis that
in a mutual consent regime, the model, under no circumstances, allows re-negotiation of the
contract relating to the split of marital surplus that was agreed to at the start of marriage. Thus,
in the language of Pollak (2019), the mutual consent regime is modeled as being characterized
by Binding Agreements in the Marriage Market (BAMM) while the unilateral divorce regime
is modeled as being characterized by a very specific form of Bargaining In Marriage (BIM).
To be precise, the specific form of BIM that I impose is known as limited commitment (for
instance, see Voena (2015) and Kocherlakota (1996)) in the literature.
If a couple divorces, each partner must remain unmarried thereafter, and her/his problem
is identical to that of an unmarried woman/man with the same state variables. The problem
for unmarried individuals is analogous to that of married couples except for the fact that they
do not receive any “taste-for-partner” shock at the end of any period and do not need to make
a decision about whether to divorce or not. Further, the legal regime does not enter into the
problem of unmarried individuals in any way.
The last period of life is different from all other periods in two respects. First, all individuals
are retired, and do not work in this period. Thus, consumption in the final period of life is
entirely out of savings. Second, for married couples, no “taste-for-partner” shock realizes in
the final period of life. Hence, there is no divorce at the end of period T . At the end of the final
period of life both spouses die without leaving any bequest.
I describe the model formally below, beginning with the life cycle.
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1.3.2

The Life Cycle

I first describe the problem of an unmarried individual.

The Problem of an Unmarried Individual
The instantaneous utility of an unmarried individual i at time t is given by:
Cit1−γ
+ lit ∗ φ(X) − 1(hit )ηith
uit (Cit , lit , hit , η) =
1−γ

(1.1)

where C denotes consumption, l denotes leisure, h denotes hours of work, h ∈ {0, 21 , 1},
which corresponds to the alternatives of not working, working part time and working full-time.
1(.) denotes the indicator function and X denotes demographic characteristics. φ denotes the
systematic utility from leisure. Associated with each discrete alternative labor supply choice is
iid

an alternative-specific taste shock denoted by ηith ∼ N (0, ση2 (X)). Conditional upon X, ηith is
assumed to be independently distributed across individuals and over time. Each individual is
endowed with a unit of time in each period and faces the following time budget constraint.

hit + lit = 1,

hit ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}

∀t < T

(1.2)

and
hiT = 0
An unmarried individual i with education level e faces the following per-period budget
constraint:
Cit = wite,g hit + Ki,t −

Ki,t+1
,
R

g ∈ {m, f }
(1.3)

and Kit ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2, .., T }
where wite,g denotes the wage earned by individual i with education level e and of gender g at
time t, Kt denotes assets at the beginning of period t, and R is the gross rate of interest. The
budget constraint requires that total consumption equal the sum of income and assets minus
savings.
9

For an unmarried person i, define the choice vector qst = {Cit , hit , lit , Ki,t+1 } and the state
vector ωts = {Kit , ηit }.
The value of an unmarried person who enters T with state vector ωiT is defined as follows:

VjT (ωiT ) =

1−γ
KiT
1−γ

Having defined ViT , recursively define Vit (ωt ) ∀t < T as follows:

 s
s
|ωts )
(ωt+1
u(Cit , hit , lit , η) + βE Vi,t+1

Vits (ωts ) = maxqst

(1.4)

subject to
the time budget constraint (1.2)
the budget constraint for singles (1.3)

Finally, note that the legal regime does not enter into the problem of the unmarried person in
any way.

The Couple’s Problem
I describe the problem beginning from the last period, i.e., period T . The state vector of a
couple that enters T married is defined as ωT = {KT , µT }, where KT denotes total marital
assets at period T and µT denotes the husband’s Pareto weights applicable in period T . As
couples are retired in the last period, the value to the couple at the beginning of period T is
given by:
VT (ωT ) = maxCmT ,Cf T

1−γ
Cf1−γ
CmT
T
µT
+ (1 − µT )
1−γ
1−γ

subject to
CmT + Cf T = ρKT ,
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ρ>1

(1.5)

Here, CmT and Cf T denote consumptions of the husband and wife at period T respectively,6
and ρ denotes the consumption economies of scale parameter. Note that these economies of
scale in consumption are available only in marriage but not in a state of singlehood. Denote the
∗
policy functions from solving the above problem as CjT
(ωT ), j ∈ {m, f }. Then the value to

spouse j in period T given state vector ωT is defined as

1−γ
∗
CjT (ωT )
VjT (ωT ) =

1−γ

In any period t prior to the last, the vector of states and controls at the beginning of period t depend on the property division regime. In a title-based property division regime, the
state vector at t is given by ωt = {Kt , κt , µt , ηt , ξt−1 }, where Kt denotes total marital assets
at the beginning of period t, κt (∈ [0, 1]) denotes the share of marital assets held under the
husband’s name, µt denotes husband’s Pareto weight applicable to the marriage at period t,
ηt is the vector of “distaste-for-work” shocks that realize at the beginning of period t, and
ξt−1 is the vector of “taste-for-partner” shocks that realized at t − 1. The choice-vector in a
title-based property division regime is given by qt = {Cmt , Cf t , hmt , hf t , lmt , lf t , Kt+1 , κt+1 }.
In words, couples observe ωt and decide how much to work, how much to consume, how to
split consumption between the two spouses, how much assets to accumulate, and how to split
property titles to those assets between the two spouses. In an equitable or a community property regime, who has the title to marital property is irrelevant, and all that matters is the total
value of assets held jointly by the couple. So, the state space in an equitable or a community
property regime is given by ωt = {Kt , µt , ηt , ξt−1 }, and the vector of controls is given by
qt = {Cmt , Cf t , hmt , hf t , lmt , lf t , Kt+1 }. Notice that κt does not feature in either the state or
the control space in these legal regimes.
At the end of period t (where t < T ), each spouse draws a “taste-for-partner” shock which
6

Note the the Pareto weight of the husband and the wife have been normalized to sum to 1.
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I denote as ξjt , j ∈ {m, f }. ξjt follows a random walk stochastic process as under7 .

ξjt = ξj,t−1 + ζjt ,

iid

ζjt ∼ N (0, σζ2 ),

ξj0 = 0

(1.6)

Given the vector of marital choices q∗t , and having observed the realized vector of “taste-forspouse” shock ξt , each spouse j computes her present discounted value from staying married
as follows:


Vejtmarr (q∗t , ξt ) = βE Vj,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , µt , ξt + ξjt

(1.7)

The present-discounted value (at the end of period t) to the couple from staying married is
computed as under
marr
+ (1 − µt )Vefmarr
Vetmarr (q∗t , ξt ) = µt Vemt
t

(1.8)

The present discounted value to spouse j of divorcing in period t with the default allocation
of marital property as specified by the property division regime P is given by

 s

s
d
Vjtd (q∗t , ξt ) = βE Vj,t+1
(ωj,t+1
)|ωjt
(q∗t , P)

(1.9)

d
(q∗t , P) is the default allocation of marital property (in the event of divorce) to spouse
Here ωjt

j under the property division regime P for a couple that has made choice qt at period t. For a
title-based property division regime,

d
∗
ωmt
(q∗t ) = κt .(Kt+1
/R)

and
∗
/R)
ωfdt (q∗t ) = (1 − κt ).(Kt+1

In a community property regime, the default division of marital property is fixed at half by
law. So,
1 ∗
d
(q∗t ) = (Kt+1
ωjt
/R),
2
7

j ∈ {m, j}

For the purpose of numerical solution, I discretized the random walk as a Markov process (see Tauchen (1986)
and Adda et al. (2003))
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In an equitable division regime, the default division of marital property is up to judge. Exante, the division of marital property is a random variable from the couple’s point of view. So,
in an equitable division regime,

∗
d
/R
(q∗t ) = κJt Kt+1
ωmt

and
∗
/R
ωfdt (q∗t ) = (1 − κJt )Kt+1

where κJt is a random variable denoting the share of marital assets accruing to the husband.
d
(q∗t ) is a random variable, and the expectation in
Thus, in an equitable division regime, ωjt
d
and shocks that will realize in period t + 1.8 By contrast,
equation (1.9) is taken both over ωjt
d
is deterministic,
in a title-based property division regime and a community property regime, ωjt

and the expectation in equation (1.9) is taken only over shocks that will realize in period t + 1.
A couple that has made a given vector q∗t of first-stage choices at t and has drawn a given
vector of shocks ξt at the end of t is faced with exactly one of the following four situations.
1. Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd

∀j ∈ {m, f }

2. Vejtmarr < Vjtd

∀j ∈ {m, f }

d
marr
< Vmt
and Vefmarr
≥ Vfdt
3. Vemt
t
marr
d
and Vefmarr
< Vfdt
4. Vemt
≥ Vmt
t

In words, (1) and (2) correspond to situations where the couple agrees to stay married or to
get divorced. In these cases the unanimously decided outcome of the couple occurs regardless
of the divorce law regime. On the other hand, cases (3) and (4) correspond to situations where
the couple are divided over whether to remain married or to divorce. In situation (3), the man
wants to divorce while the woman wants to remain married while in situation (4), the intentions
of the spouses are the reverse.
The conditions under which the marriage can be dissolved depends on the divorce law
regime. In a mutual consent regime, divorce requires the consent of both spouses. So, if spouse
8

h
 s
i
s
d
Technically, in an equitable division regime, Vjtd (q∗t , ξt ) = βEωjt
Eηt+1 Vj,t+1
(ωj,t+1
)|ωjt
(q∗t , P)
d
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j wants divorce and spouse j 0 wants to remain married, the allocation of marital assets in the
event of divorce may be re-negotiated (in favor of spouse j 0 ) to make her indifferent between
marriage and divorce. In such a situation, spouse j solves for λ∗ such that

λ∗ = min λ
s.t. λ ∈ [0, 1]
(1.10)


∗
s.t. Vejmarr
= βEηj0 ,t+1 Vjs0 ,t+1 (λKt+1
, ηj 0 ,t+1 )
0 ,t
 s

∗
s.t. Vejtmarr ≤ βEηj,t+1 Vj,t+1
((1 − λ)Kt+1
, ηj,t+1 )
If λ∗ does not exist, the marriage continues. On the other hand, if a solution to (1.10) exists,
divorce occurs, and the division of marital property is as per λ∗ and the values to spouses j and
reneg,d
respectively, where
j 0 are Vej,t
and Vejmarr
0 ,t

 s
reneg,d
∗
, ηj,t+1 ) . Note that in a mutual consent regime, the
((1 − λ∗ )Kt+1
Vej,t
= βEηj,t+1 Vj,t+1

husband’s Pareto weight in marriage (denoted by µ) is not re-negotiated under any circumstance. So, in a mutual consent regime we have µt = µ ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T }, where µ is determined in the marriage market as described in Section 1.3.3. Let Dt∗ denote the indicator for
divorce at the end of period t.9 Given q∗t and ξt , the present value to the couple at the end of t
is:
marr
Vet (q∗t , ξt ) = 1(Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ (µVemt
+ (1 − µ)Vefmarr
)
t
d
+ 1(Vejtmarr < Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ (µVmt
+ (1 − µ)Vfdt )


reneg,d
marr
d e marr
+ (1 − µ)Vefmarr
+
< Vmt
, Vf t
≥ Vfdt ) ∗ Dt∗ µVemt
+ 1(Vemt
t

marr
(1 − Dt∗ )(µVemt
+ (1 − µ)Vefmarr
)
t


marr
marr
d e marr
+
, Vf t
< Vfdt ) ∗ Dt∗ µVemt
+ (1 − µ)Vefreneg,d
+ 1(Vemt
≥ Vmt
t

marr
+ (1 − µ)Vefmarr
)
(1 − Dt∗ )(µVemt
t

(1.11)

The values to the man and woman, denoted by Vemt and Vef t respectively, are defined as
9

Dt∗ = 1 if divorce occurs at the end of period t, and Dt∗ = 0 otherwise.
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follows:
marr
d
Vemt (q∗t , ξt ) = 1(Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vemt
+ 1(Vejtmarr < Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vmt


reneg,d
marr
d e marr
marr
+ 1(Vemt
< Vmt
, Vf t
≥ Vfdt ) ∗ Dt∗ Vemt
+ (1 − Dt∗ ) Vemt
marr
d e marr
marr
+ 1(Vemt
≥ Vmt
, Vf t
< Vfdt ) ∗ Vemt

+ 1(Vejtmarr < Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vfdt
Vef t (q∗t , ξt ) = 1(Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vefmarr
t
marr
d e marr
+ 1(Vemt
< Vmt
, Vf t
≥ Vfdt ) ∗ Vefmarr
t


marr
d e marr
+ 1(Vemt
≥ Vmt
, Vf t
< Vfdt ) ∗ Dt∗ Vefreneg,d
+ (1 − Dt∗ ) Vefmarr
t
t

(1.12)
By contrast, in a unilateral divorce regime, marriage, rather than divorce requires the consent of both spouses. So, if the husband wants to divorce and the wife wants to stay married,
the husband’s Pareto weight in marriage applicable in the next period, ie µt+1 might be renegotiated so that the husband may be made indifferent between marriage and divorce. In such
a situation, the wife solves for µ∗t+1 such that

µ∗t+1 = min µt+1
s.t. µt+1 ∈ [0, 1]


d
s.t. βE Vm,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , ξt , µt+1 = Vmt


s.t. βE Vf,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , ξt , µt+1 ≥ Vfdt

(1.13)

If a solution to the above problem exists, the marriage continues into the next period with
husband’s Pareto weight µ∗t+1 and Dt∗ = 0 and the value to spouse j, j ∈ {m, f } is given by


Vejtreneg,uni = βE Vj,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , ξt , µ∗t+1

Otherwise, divorce occurs with the division of marital property as specified by the default
property division regime and Dt∗ = 1. Here, Dt∗ is an indicator for divorce. Note that in
a unilateral divorce regime, if a divorce occurs, the division of marital property follows the
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default under the property division regime in question, and is not re-negotiated upon in any
circumstance.
Conversely, if the wife wants to divorce and the husband wants to stay married for some
vector q∗t of first-stage choices at t and and a given realization of shocks ξt at the end of t,
the husband’s Pareto weight in marriage applicable in the next period, ie µt+1 might be renegotiated so that the wife may be made indifferent between marriage and divorce. In such a
situation, the husband solves for µ∗t+1 such that
µ∗t+1 = max µt+1
s.t. µt+1 ∈ [0, 1]


s.t. βE Vf,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , ξt , µt+1 = Vfdt


d
s.t. βE Vm,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , ξt , µt+1 ≥ Vmt

(1.14)

If a solution to the above problem exists, the marriage continues into the next period with
husband’s Pareto weight µ∗t+1 and the value to spouse j, j ∈ {m, f } is given by


Vejtreneg,uni = βE Vj,t+1 (ωt+1 )|q∗t , ξt , µ∗t+1

Otherwise, divorce occurs with the division of marital property as specified by the default
property division regime and Dt∗ = 1. Hence, given q∗t and ξt , the present value to the couple
at the end of t is
marr
Vet (q∗t , ξt ) = 1(Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ (µt Vemt
+ (1 − µt )Vefmarr
)
t
d
+ (1 − µt )Vefdt )
+ 1(Vejtmarr < Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ (µt Vemt


marr
d e marr
d
+ 1(Vemt
< Vmt
, Vf t
≥ Vfdt ) ∗ Dt∗ µt Vemt
+ (1 − µt )Vefdt +

reneg,uni
)
(1 − Dt∗ )(µt Vemt
+ (1 − µt )Vefreneg,uni
t


marr
d e marr
d
+ 1(Vemt
≥ Vmt
, Vf t
< Vfdt ) ∗ Dt∗ µt Vemt
+ (1 − µt )Vefdt +

reneg,uni
(1 − Dt∗ )(µt Vemt
+ (1 − µt )Vefreneg,uni
)
t
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(1.15)

The values to the man and woman, denoted Vemt and Vef t respectively are defined as follows
d
marr
+ 1(Vejtmarr < Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vmt
Vemt (q∗t , ξt ) = 1(Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vemt
marr
d e marr
d
+ 1(Vemt
< Vmt
, Vf t
≥ Vfdt ) ∗ Vmt
reneg,uni
marr
d e marr
d
+ 1(Vemt
≥ Vmt
, Vf t
< Vfdt ) ∗ (Dt∗ Vmt
+ (1 − Dt∗ )Vemt
)

+ 1(Vejtmarr < Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vfdt
Vef t (q∗t , ξt ) = 1(Vejtmarr ≥ Vjtd , j ∈ {m, f }) ∗ Vefmarr
t
marr
d e marr
+ 1(Vemt
< Vmt
, Vf t
≥ Vfdt ) ∗ (Dt∗ Vfdt + (1 − Dt∗ Vfreneg,uni
))
t
marr
d e marr
+ 1(Vemt
≥ Vmt
, Vf t
< Vfdt ) ∗ Vfdt

(1.16)
By allowing the Pareto weight to be subject to re-negotiation period-by-period in a unilateral divorce regime, the model implies that the marital contract in a unilateral divorce regime
is characterized by limited commitment rather than by full commitment. Limited commitment
implies that some splits of the marital surplus are not possible to credibly commit to ex-ante
(see Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon et al. (2000), Ligon et al. (2002), Mazzocco et al. (2013)). On
the other hand, the marriage contract in a mutual consent regime is characterized by full commitment. Couples’ decisions to divorce or to stay married coincide with the efficient outcome
in a mutual consent regime.
I now describe the problem of a couple that enters period t married with state vector ωt .
First, note that the instantaneous utility to spouse j at time t is given by:

ujt (Cjt , ljt , hjt , η) =

1−γ
Cjt
h
+ 1jt (NW) ∗ φ(X) + 1jt (PT) ∗ 0.5 ∗ φ(X) − 1(hjt )ηjt
(1.17)
1−γ

where C denotes consumption, l denotes leisure, h denotes hours of work, which is constrained
to be one of the three discrete alternatives, namely, full time, part time or non-participation in
the workforce. Associated with each discrete alternative labor supply choice is an alternativeiid

h
h
specific taste shock denoted by ηjt
∼ N (0, ση2 ). ηjt
is assumed to be independently distributed

across individuals and over time. Note that the distribution of the vector ηjt is independent of
marital status.
I assume that wages are exogenously given and vary by education and gender. Given gender,
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more educated individuals have higher wages and given education, women may earn less than
e
men on account of the gender pay gap. Thus, wfe = φwm

∀e ∈ {High, Low}, φ ≤ 1. For a

0

married couple (me , f e ) with husband’s and wife’s education levels e and e0 respectively, the
per-period budget constraint is
0

e
Cmt + Cf t = ρ.(wmt
hmt + wfe t hf t + Kt −

Kt+1
)
R

(1.18)

and Kt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T }
with Kt = Kmt + Kf t , where Kt denotes assets in period t and ρ > 1. The budget constraint
requires that total household consumption equal the sum of total household income and assets
minus savings, inflated by the economies of scale (in marriage) parameter ρ.
The couple solves
Vt (ωt ) = maxqt



µt umt + (1 − µt ) uf t + Eξt Vet (qt , ξt )|ωt

s.t. the per-period budget constraint (1.18)

(1.19)

s.t. the time budget constraint (1.2)
∗
∗
∗
, κ∗t+1 }10 be a solution to (1.19). Then the
, lf∗ t , Kt+1
, Cf∗t , h∗mt , h∗f t , lmt
Let q∗t (ωt ) = {Cmt

present values to an individual spouse j, j ∈ {m, f }, at the beginning of period t is given by

Vjt (ωt ) =

∗ 1−γ
(Cjt
)
+ 1it (NW) ∗ φ(X) + 1it (PT) ∗ 0.5 ∗ φ(X) − 1(hit )ηith
1−γ


+ Eξt Vejt (qt , ξt )|ωt

(1.20)

To initialize the problem, I assume that across property division regimes, marriage starts
with zero marital assets, i.e., K1 = 0, and κ1 = 21 .
Solving the lifecycle problem in any given divorce and property division regime yields,
for each gender g and education level e, the expected values of singlehood (denoted by EVges )
0

and marriage to each education category e0 (denoted by EVgee (µe,e0 ), e, e0 ∈ {High, Low})
for that legal regime. Here, the expectation is taken prior to the start of the life cycle. Note
10

Technically, this is the choice vector in a title-based property division regime. In a community property
∗
∗
∗
regime, the corresponding choice vector is q∗t (ωt ) = {Cmt
, Cf∗t , h∗mt , h∗f t , lmt
, lf∗ t , Kt+1
}.
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that the expected value to a person with a given gender and a given level of education of
marrying a partner with a given level of education depends on the Pareto weight applicable in
that marital pairing at the time of entering the marriage. These Pareto weights are determined
in the marriage market which I describe below.

1.3.3

The Marriage Market

Following Choo & Siow (2006) (also see Gayle & Shephard (2019) and Chiappori et al.
(2018)), I assume that an individual i of any gender with any education level receives, over
and above the systematic component of utility, an idiosyncratic payoff from marrying each
type of individual of the opposite sex. Let θie denote this idiosyncratic payoff received by individual i for any member of the opposite sex with education level e. Notice that θie depends
only on the type of the individual of the opposite sex but not on her/his specific identity. Thus,
the problem of a given individual i of gender g with education level e ∈ {H, L}, is

max {EVgeH (µe,H ) + θiH , EVgeL (µe,L ) + θiL , EVges + θis }

{H,L,s}

(1.21)

Here, superscripts H, L and s refer to the alternatives of marrying a high type, low type and
staying single respectively and µee0 denotes the husband’s Pareto weight in a marriage of a
man with education level e to a woman with education level e0 . I assume that the idiosyncratic
payoffs θie follow Type-I extreme value distribution with a zero location parameter and the
scale parameter σθ . Hence, the proportion of type e males that would be willing to marry type
0

e0 females, which is denoted by peme , is given by


0
0
s
e0
e
(µe,e ) + θie , EVme
+ θis }
peme (µee , µee0 ) = Pr EVme
(µe,e0 ) + θie > max{EVme
0

=

0

e
e
exp[EVme
(µe,e0 )/σθ ]
Dme
(µee , µee0 )
=
0
e (µ 0 )/σ ] + exp[EV e (µ )/σ ] + exp[EV s /σ ]
Nme
exp[EVme
e,e
θ
e,e
θ
θ
me
me

(1.22)
0

e
where Dme
denotes “demand” for type e0 females by type e males and Nme denotes the measure

of males with education level e in the population. Similarly, the proportion of type e0 females
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that would be willing to marry type e males, which is denoted by pef e0 , is given by


0
0
pef e0 (µee0 , µe0 e0 ) = Pr EVfee0 (µe,e0 ) + θie > max{EVfee0 (µe0 ,e0 ) + θie , EVfse0 + θis }
=

exp[EVfee0 (µe,e0 )/σθ ]
Sfee0 (µee0 , µe0 e0 )
=
0
Nf e0
exp[EVfee0 (µe,e0 )/σθ ] + exp[EVfee0 (µe0 ,e0 )/σθ ] + exp[EVfse0 /σθ ]
(1.23)

where Sfee0 denotes “supply” of type e0 females to type e males.
0

Given the expected value functions EVges and EVgee , g ∈ {m.f }; e, e0 ∈ {H, L}, the equilibrium in the marriage market consists of the following objects satisfying CONDITION A
below:
1. A vector of husband’s Pareto weights µ∗ = (µ∗HH , µ∗HL , µ∗LH , µ∗LL )
0

e
2. Dme
(µ∗e,e0 ), e, e0 ∈ {H, L} which denotes the number of men with education e who marry

women with education e0 , given husband’s Pareto weight µ∗e,e0 .
3. Sfee0 (µ∗e,e0 ), e0 , e ∈ {H, L} which denotes the number of women with education e0 who
marry women with education e, given husband’s Pareto weight µ∗e,e0 .
0

e
CONDITION A: Dme
µ∗e,e0 = Sfee0 µ∗e,e0 ∀e, e0 ∈ {H, L}.

Proposition 1 in Gayle & Shephard (2019) demonstrates that the equilibrium in such a
model exists and is unique. As all relevant regularity conditions hold, it follows the equilibrium
in the current model exists and is unique.

1.4

Data, Identification and Estimation

I estimate the model using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics(PSID). The PSID
is a long panel of a representative sample of American households. Households in the study
were interviewed annually from 1968 to 1997, and bi-annually thereafter. It contains rich information on education and employment history of the household head and and his/her spouse.
Crucial for the current analysis, it contains information on marital histories of the head and
his/her spouse. Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics on key variables. Something that stands
out is that about 22% of all marriages end in a divorce.
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I estimate parameters of the model using data on marriages that were solemnized in a mutual
consent, equitable division regime, and remained in that regime for at least 10 years. For the
purpose of estimation, I pre-set the values of a few parameters. These are presented in Table
1.2. Also, each period in the model corresponds to 5 years in the data. In the model, I have
distinguished between two types of individuals on the marriage market, namely, those with high
and low education. For the purpose of estimation, I define individuals with thirteen or more
completed years of schooling as “high” and the rest as “low”. Thus, the high type consists of
some college and above, whereas everybody else is classified as “low” type.
The parameters to be estimated are as follows:
1. The scale of taste shocks σθ . Recall that these shocks are drawn in the marriage market.
2. The standard deviation of alternative-specific “distaste-for-work” shock ση , allowed to
vary by education group and gender.
3. The systematic utility form leisure φ, allowed to vary by education group and gender.
4. The standard deviation of the “taste-for-partner” shock σζ .
Identification of these parameters is achieved in the following way: The rate of non-marriage
(or singlehood) identifies σθ . Labor supply decisions of married individuals identify ση and φ
.Divorce rates identify σζ . Finally, the Pareto weights are identified by population vectors of
the different education groups by gender. Assuming an even sex ratio, the population vector
used is obtained from the CPS and is presented in Table 1.3.
I estimate the model using the simulated method of moments (see McFadden (1989), Pakes
& Pollard (1989)). In order to speed up the estimation, I use an equilibrium constraints (or
MPEC) approach (Su & Judd (2012)). In practice, this translates into the following estimation
b guess , and
routine: Given an initial guess of the vector of structural parameters, denoted as Θ
b guess ), the model generates
associated marriage-market clearing vector of Pareto weights µ∗ (Θ
moments to which data counterparts exist. The estimation routine iterates on the guess for
structural parameters until moments simulated from the model are “close” enough, as measured by a standard criterion function, to the moments in the data. Formally, let any vector
b and associated moments obtained by simulating the
of structural parameters be denoted by Θ,
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b Further, let the data counterparts to which data counterparts exist. I
model be momsim (Θ).
b ∗ and associated market-clearing
denote the data counterpart as momdata . I choose that vector Θ
b ∗ ) such that:
Pareto weights , µ∗ (Θ


 

b ∗ , µ∗ (Θ
b ∗ )] = argmin momsim (Θ, µ) − momdata 0 W momsim (Θ, µ) − momdata
[Θ
Θ,µ

s.t.

e0
Dme
(µ∗e,e , µ∗e,e0 )

(1.24)
=

Sfee0 (µ∗e,e0 , µ∗e0 ,e0 )

0

∀e, e ∈ {H, L}

where W is a diagonal matrix, whose element is proportional to the inverse of the diagonal
variance-covariance of the moments in the data.
Parameter estimates are presented in Table 1.4. The model moments and data moments are
presented in Table 1.6. We notice that for the estimated parameter values, the model is able
to replicate several moments of the data, which include male and female labor supply, rates of
non-marriage (or singlehood) and the rate of divorce.

1.5
1.5.1

Results
Simulation Results

I use the parameter estimates obtained by targeting moments from marriages under mutual
consent, equitable division regime to simulate behavior in the other legal regimes. Simulation
results are presented in Table 1.7. In what follows, I describe the a few key patterns observed
in the simulations.
First, according to the simulations, introduction of equitable division in any divorce law
regime leads to a decrease in the proportion of the population that marries. Moreover, the
change in divorce and property division laws from mutual consent, title-based to of unilateral,
equitable leads to roughly a 6% reduction in the proportion of the population that marries.
Given that the reduction in the proportion of the population that had married at least once (see
Figure 1.1) was about 33%, my findings indicate that equitable division laws account for about
18% of the long-term retreat from marriage. To put the number into perspective, the findings in
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Reynoso (2019) imply that unilateral divorce laws account for only about 3% of the long-term
decline in the rate of marriage.11
My finding that there are more marriages in a title-based property division regime than in
an equitable division regime is intuitively reasonable. In a title-based regime each individual
knows that she/he can retain her/his own property in the event of divorce. So, an individual is
more open to entering into a marriage. On the other hand, in an equitable division regime the
prospect of the partner taking away half the property in the event of divorce deters individuals
from entering into a marriage. Further, this pattern is starker in a unilateral divorce regime.
This is reasonable because a title-based property division law in a unilateral divorce regime
entails maximum flexibility in terms of retaining one’s own assets, and in quitting the marriage
with it if she/he does not like it at some point. While one’s spouse can also exercise this option,
ex-ante it makes sense to enter into marriage in the hope of benefiting from economies of scale.
On the other hand, equitable division in a unilateral divorce regime provides the maximum
disincentives against marriage. Entering into marriage is a risky proposition because a spouse
can quit with half the property unilaterally.
Second, the simulations indicate that the legal regime had only a minor effect on assortative
matching as measured by the proportion of couples with the same level of education. The
proportion of assortatively matched individuals is around 0.52 in each legal regime. Thus, my
simulations indicate that while changes in divorce and property division laws affect decisions on
the extensive marriage margin, they leave decisions on the intensive marriage margin relatively
unaffected. The explanation for this finding is as follows: In the model, the changes in divorce
and property division laws exert two opposing forces on marital sorting patterns. The highest
income earners, i.e., highly educated men, are less willing to marry a less educated woman
in a unilateral divorce, equitable division regime than in a mutual consent, title-based regime.
The reason for this is that in a unilateral divorce, equitable division, the high income earner
is concerned that the low income earner may quit the marriage unilaterally, and with half the
marital property, to which the high income earner would have principally contributed. This
force causes some high income earners not to marry. Those who marry prefer equally educated
11

The magnitude of decline in the proportion of the population that marries in Reynoso (2019) are based on my
calculations from Tables 2, 3 and 6 in Reynoso (2019).
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women if they marry, and this tends to make marital sorting more assortative in a unilateral
divorce, equitable division regime. However, given that fewer high income earners marry, the
high earning males willing to marry are scarcer in the marriage market, and command a higher
share of the marital surplus in a unilateral divorce, equitable division regime (see Table 1.5).
This discourages highly educated women from marrying highly educated men, and tends to
reduce assortative matching. Given that there are two opposing forces at play, the direction
of change in assortative matching is determined by which force dominates. My simulations
indicate that the two forces roughly cancel out one another, so that assortative matching remains
unchanged.
Third, Figure 1.4 reveals that in any divorce law regime, accumulation of marital assets is
higher in a title-based property division regime as compared to an equitable division regime.
Interestingly, these results stand in contrast to those in Voena (2015) who studies behavior of
couples who married in a mutual consent, title-based regime and experienced a change in legal
regime while they were married. Restricting her analysis to such couples, she finds that the
introduction of unilateral divorce, equitable division laws increase rates of asset accumulation.
The introduction of equitable division acts as a tax on asset accumulation for the highincome earner, typically the man, and reduces his incentive to save. On the other hand, equitable division laws increase the low-income earner’s incentive to save, because she is entitled
to a higher share of the marital property in the event of divorce as compared to what title-based
property settlements would entail. Since the low income earner’s consumption in divorce is
lower than the high income earner’s consumption in divorce, concavity of the utility function
implies that the low income earner’s incentives to increase asset accumulation is stronger than
the high income earner’s incentive to reduce asset accumulation in an equitable division regime.
Given that the household maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities of the husband and
the wife, the effect of the introduction of equitable division on household asset accumulation
is ambiguous, and depends on the relative bargaining weights of the husband and the wife.
Thus, the finding in Voena (2015) that the introduction of equitable division increases asset
accumulation reflects the fact that if one assumes that the household bargaining weights remain
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unchanged in the newly-introduced unilateral divorce, equitable division regime,12 the incentive of the low income earner (to increase asset accumulation) dominates the incentives of the
high income earner (to decrease asset accumulation) in the household decision problem. This
is reflected in higher rates of asset accumulation in an equitable division regime as compared
to that in a title-based property division regime.
My analysis differs from the analysis in Voena (2015) in that I allow the marriage market to
equilibrate separately in each legal regime. As mentioned before, I find that the introduction of
equitable division laws increase the rate of non-marriage. As discussed above, men, typically
the high income earner on account of the gender-pay gap, have lower incentives to marry in an
equitable division regime. Those men who marry obtain a higher share of the marital surplus in
the new equilibrium (see Table 1.5). Given that the husband’s utility has a higher weight in the
equilibrium under an equitable division regime, the incentives of the husband to reduce asset
accumulation gains priority over the wife’s incentives to increase asset accumulation. This is
reflected in a lower rate of asset accumulation in the household in an equitable division regime
as compared to the rate of asset accumulation in a title-based property division regime.
Fourth, the model predicts that the probability of a marriage ending in a divorce varies
by legal regime. Regardless of the divorce law regime, the introduction of equitable division
reduces the rate of divorce. For instance, the proportion of marriages that end in a divorce in
the first ten years is about 31% lower in a mutual consent, equitable division than in a mutual
consent, title-based regime. In contrast to equitable division, the introduction of unilateral
divorce increases the rate of divorce in any property division regime. Overall, the change
in divorce and property division laws from mutual consent, title-based to unilateral, equitable
division increases the rate of divorce by 3 percentage points, and accounts for only about 11% of
the long-term increase in the rate of divorce as seen in Figure 1.2. These findings are consistent
with Wolfers (2006) who found that the introduction of unilateral divorce did not lead to a
significant persistent increase in the rate of divorce.
12

This is a perfectly valid assumption for the research question in Voena (2015), who studies how changes
in divorce and property division laws affect the behavior of couples who married before these legal changes.
However, I do not make that assumption in this paper because I tackle a different question: How does the change
in divorce and property division laws affect marriage decisions, i.e., whether to marry and whom to marry, and
how the marriages that form in the new legal regime behave differently as compared to marriages that formed in
the old legal regime.
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My finding that the divorce rate in a mutual consent, equitable division regime is lower than
in any other legal regime makes intuitive sense. In a mutual consent, equitable division regime,
the conditions for divorce are the most stringent. First, mutual consent implies that the consent
of both spouses is necessary for divorce. Moreover, if a partner wants to quit the marriage while
the other wants to continue with the marriage, it is extremely hard for a partner desiring divorce
to convince the dissenting partner to agree to the divorce. This is because the default divorce
allocation is a half-half share to begin with, so in order to convince the dissenting spouse to
divorce a lot of compensation needs to be provided, which might make divorce unprofitable
for the partner desiring divorce in the first place. By contrast, in a mutual consent, title-based
regime, if the richer spouse wants to quit the marriage and the poorer spouse wants to stay
married, the richer spouse, by virtue of being the richer person, has more resources to transfer
to the poorer spouse in the event of divorce. Hence, the richer spouse has a better prospect of
convincing the poorer spouse to divorce in this legal regime. Further, note that the unilateral,
equitable division has a high divorce rate as well. This is because equitable division implies
the outside option of each spouse is rather high. When hit by a bad “taste-for-partner” shock,
the unilateral divorce entails that any spouse can quit the marriage on her own volition.
Fifth, I find that divorce and property division laws have negligible effect on the labor force
participation of men. The labor force participation of women is more sensitive to changes in
divorce and property division laws. The change in divorce and property division laws from
mutual consent, title-based to unilateral, equitable division reduces female labor force participation. In the model the introduction of equitable division exerts two opposing forces on female
labor force participation. First, it reduces women’s incentives to work because they are entitled
to a greater share of marital assets in the event of divorce. On the other hand, the bargaining
weight of men is higher in the new regime. That causes the household to place less weight on
women’s leisure, and tends to increase labor supply of women. My simulations indicate that
the former effect dominates the latter, and is consistent with the findings of Chiappori et al.
(2002).
In summary, the simulations indicate that change in divorce and property division laws
affect selection into marriage but do not affect patterns of marital sorting. Moreover, behavior
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within marriage is affected substantially by changes in divorce and property division laws.
Marriages in equitable division regime accumulate less assets as compared to marriages in
a title-based property division regime. Further, the stability of marriage is affected by the
prevalent divorce and property division laws. Marriages in mutual consent, equitable division
regime appear to be more stable than marriages in any other legal regime.

1.5.2

Empirical Validation

As mentioned above, I have estimated parameters of the model by targeting data from marriages
that took place and remained in mutual consent, equitable division regime. Thus, while the
parameter values are chosen to replicate the data under mutual consent, equitable division,
the model is not disciplined by the data under any other legal regime. Hence, the simulated
behavior of agents in the model may or may not align with the behavior of agents in the actual
data obtained from any other legal regime. So, the extent to which the model is able to replicate
the data in any legal regime other than mutual consent, equitable division serves as a test for
external validity of the predictions of the model.
Fortunately, the PSID data contain empirical counterparts to quite a few important model
moments like marital sorting patterns and marital histories. However, testing the extent to
which predictions of the model find support in the data is not straightforward. This is on
account of the fact that the legal regimes were changing quickly through the 1970s and 1980s.
Hence, for some legal regimes, for example unilateral divorce and title-based property division,
there are not enough marriages in the data that were solemnized in that particular legal regime
and remained in it for a reasonable period of time (say, 10 years). Nonetheless, I try to test the
predictions of the model in the data to the extent feasible.
First, I test the prediction that divorce and property division laws did not change patterns
of assortative matching. To that end, I run the following regression13 to test if the correlation
between the years of schooling of the husband and the wife has been affected by divorce and
property division laws:
13

This regression specification has been used in the prior literature (see Greenwood et al. (2014), Reynoso
(2019)).
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wife
wife
Yrs of Eduhus
jst =β0 + β1 Yrs of Edujst + β2 1(Unilateral)st ∗ Yrs of Edujst

+ β3 1(Equitable)st ∗ Yrs of Eduwife
jst
+ β4 1(Unilateral)st ∗ 1(Equitable)st ∗ Yrs of Eduwife
jst

(1.25)

+ β5 1(Unilateral) + β5 1(Equitable) + β6 Xjst
+ β7 t + Λs + Λs ∗ t + jst
where j indexes a married couple, s indexes a state and t indexes the year of marriage.
The coefficient β1 measures correlation between the husband’s and wife’s years of education,
controlling for spousal characteristics (X), state fixed effects(Λs ), a linear time trend t, and
the interaction of the linear time trend with state fixed effects. β2 (β3 ) measures how the introduction of unilateral(equitable) divorce into the baseline mutual consent, title-based regime
affected the correlation between spousal educational attainment. Finally, β4 measures the extent
to which introduction of equitable division in an unilateral regime affects the spousal correlation between educational attainment over and above the effect on the variable induced by the
introduction of unilateral divorce. Table 1.9 provides OLS estimates of equation (1.25). We
notice that estimates of β2 , β3 and β4 are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that change in legal regime did not affect spousal correlation in educational attainment,14
thereby providing empirical support for the predictions of the model.
Second, I test if the there is any empirical support for the prediction that the rate of nonmarriage was affected by the property division regime. Consistent with the model, I find that
regardless of the divorce law regime, the proportion of individuals who had never married by
age 30 was higher in equitable division than in a title-based regime. For instance, amongst
individuals who lived in a mutual consent divorce regime until age 30, the proportion of nevermarried individuals who lived in a title-based state until age 30 was only 4.38%. Amongst
those whose states witnessed a change in property division regime to equitable, the proportion
of never-married (by age 30) was 9.14%. A similar and more dramatic pattern is observed
14

How to measure assortative matching is a contentious issue. While the method used above has been used
earlier (see Greenwood et al. (2014)), its appropriateness has been questioned by Eika et al. (2014) and Gihleb &
Lang (2016).

28

amongst individuals living in a unilateral divorce regime. In what follows, I restrict attention
to individuals whose states had unilateral divorce by the time they were 30. For individuals who
lived in title-based states until they were 30, the proportion of never-married was 9.12%. By
contrast, for individuals whose states had witnessed a transition to equitable division regime,
the proportion of never-married was was 29.72%.
Third, I test the prediction of the model in respect of asset accumulation. Recall that the
model predicts that in any divorce law regime the rate of asset accumulation is lower in an
equitable division regime than in a title-based property division regime. If that is true, we
must find the following pattern in the data: Observationally equivalent households that formed
and remained in equitable division regime accumulated lower assets than their counterparts
that formed and remained in title-based property division regime. The PSID collects detailed
information on assets only in selected years. In order to test the prediction of the model, we
must use information from those years where there are sufficiently many households satisfying
the aforesaid sample restriction. I find that the asset data in 1989 satisfies this criterion. To test
if the rate of asset accumulation was lower in an equitable division regime as compared to a
title-based property division regime, I specify the following regression:

Asseti = β0 + β1 1(Equitable) + Xi + i

(1.26)

Here, Asseti is the dollar value of assets accumulated by couple i in 1989. I restrict the sample
to those couples that satisfy one of the following two criteria:
1. The couple married in a title-based regime and remained in a title-based regime up to
1989.
2. The couple married in an equitable division regime and remained in an equitable division
regime up to 1989.
Notice that the coefficient β1 measures the difference in assets accumulated by a couple in an
equitable division regime and assets accumulated by a couple in a title-based property division
regime, conditioning on background characteristics of the couple given by the vector X. Here,
The vector X includes age of the household head, years of schooling of the husband and the
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wife and year of marriage. Table 1.10 presents estimates of equation (1.26). In line with the
predictions of the model, the coefficient estimate of β1 is negative and statistically significant
at the 10% level.
Fourth, I test the prediction of the model in respect to divorce rates. Recall that the model
A challenge in doing this is that since the laws changed very quickly over the 1970s, we do
not observe sufficient number of marriages to make inferences about life cycle behaviors for all
legal regimes. The legal regimes where the sample sizes support such analysis include mutual
consent, equitable division; mutual consent, title-based; and unilateral divorce, community
property. In all cases, I restrict my analysis to such marriages that would have been in the same
legal regime if it had survived for at least 10 years. Figure 1.5 shows that the cumulative rate of
divorce (after the passage of the same amount of time) is lower in a mutual consent, equitable
division regime as compared to mutual consent, title-based or unilateral divorce, community
property regime. Table 1.11 shows that this pattern is robust to the introduction of controls for
husband’s age at marriage and year of marriage fixed effects.

1.5.3

Welfare Analysis

The changes in divorce and property division laws have implications for welfare, both from the
viewpoints of efficiency and distribution. Divorce and property division laws distort marriage
decisions, particularly on the extensive margin. Unilateral divorce introduces limited commitment into the marital contract, and makes certain splits of marital surplus not possible to
credibly commit to ex-ante. Equitable division laws erode the gains from marriage by distorting incentives to accumulate assets within marriage. These distortions imply welfare losses,
and I use the estimated model to quantify the magnitude of these losses.
Formally, the utilitarian welfare function is specified as follows:

W(L) =

X
g∈{m,f },e∈{H,L}

X

s
Nge
(L).EVges +

0

0

e
Nge
(L).EVgee (L)

(1.27)

g∈{m,f };e,e0 ∈{H,L}

where L denotes the vector of divorce and property division laws, EVges denotes the expected
s
utility of an individual of gender g and education level e who remains unmarried, Nge
(L)
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denotes the measure of individuals of gender g and education level e who remain unmarried
0

under the legal regime L, EVgee (L) denotes the expected utility of an individual of gender g
and education level e who marries an individual with education level e0 under the legal regime
0

e
(L) denotes the measure of individuals of gender g and education level e that marry
L, and Nge

individuals with education level e0 under the legal regime L.
I first welfare-rank the legal regimes using from the viewpoint of a utilitarian social planner
in each legal regime. I find that a utilitarian social planner ranks the legal regimes in the
following order:
1. Mutual consent, title-based
2. Mutual consent, equitable division
3. Unilateral, title-based
4. Unilateral, equitable division
To quantify the effect of welfare losses implied by a legal regime relative to a mutual consent, title-based regime. Results are presented in Table 1.8. I find that the long-term change in
legal regime from mutual consent, title-basedto a unilateral divorce, equitable division results
in about 20% welfare loss as measured in utility units. However, this loss is welfare is unequally shared between the two sexes. Both men and women are worse off, but men shoulder
a greater share of the burden. About 65% of the burden falls on men, while the remaining 35%
is borne by women.

1.6

Conclusion

In this paper, I study how changes in divorce and property division laws affected marital decisions and behaviors within marriage such as asset accumulation and divorce. To that end,
I formulate a rich structural microeconometric model featuring collective households making
labor supply, asset accumulation and divorce decisions. I embed the model of the collective
household in an empirical marriage-matching model. To quantify the effect of these legal
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changes, I estimate parameters of the model using data from marriages under a mutual consent,
equitable division regime and simulate behavior under other legal regimes, namely, mutual
consent, title-based; unilateral, title-based; and unilateral, equitable. I find that equitable division laws reduce the rate of marriage, and account for 18% of the long-term decline in the
rate of marriage in the United States. Moreover, consistent with the data, equitable division
laws reduce the rates of asset accumulation and divorce. Further, both unilateral divorce and
equitable division laws lead to substantial losses in economic efficiency.
While this paper represents the first step in the direction of understanding the longer-term
consequences of changes in divorce and property division laws, there are several limitations of
the exercise. For instance, I have assumed changes in divorce laws do not affect pre-investment
in education. Such an assumption may be reasonable for individuals who were too old to adjust
educational attainments in response to changes in these laws. However, a complete understanding of the long-term consequences of these legal changes should factor in endogenous
pre-investment in education. Similarly, my framework does not consider cohabitation, which
has become more common as a living arrangement over time. To what extent changes in divorce and property division laws changed incentives to cohabit is an interesting question. The
exploration of such open questions is left for future research.
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1.7

Figures
Figure 1.1: Proportion Ever-Married by Year of Birth (PSID Data)

Figure 1.2: Proportion Ever-Divorced/Separated by Year of Marriage (PSID Data)
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Figure 1.3: Fraction of States in a Legal Regime over Time
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Figure 1.4: Simulated Asset Accumulation Profile by Legal Regime
260
Mut-title
Uni-title
Mut-equi
Uni-equi

Value of Accumulated Assets

240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
5

10

15

Years from marriage

34

Figure 1.5: Cumulative Divorce Rates by Legal Regime (PSID Data)
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Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics

Variable
Yrs of schoolHusb − Yrs of schoolWife
Husband’s years of schooling
1(Community Property)
1(Equitable)
1(Unilateral)
Order of marriage
Age at marriage
1(Marriage ended in Divorce)
Year of marriage
Labor Force Participation (Male)
Labor Force Participation (Female)
Hours of Work Yearly (Male)
Hours of Work Yearly (Female)
Annual Household Income

Observations
10228
11029
12969
12969
12969
12886
12890
28682
12969
124,052
132,878
106,652
82,942
56,792

Mean
Standard Deviation
-.121
2.245
12.568
2.629
.26
.439
.556
.497
.511
.5
1.341
.628
29.133
10.06
.218
.413
1987.911
12.1
.860
.347
.628
.483
2061.682
696.128
1670.893
577.447
13194.55
13507.28

Source: My calculations from PSID Data (Family, Individual and Marriage History Files)
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Table 1.2: Pre-set Parameters
Parameter
Value
T (Total time periods in the model)
4
γ (Relative Risk-Aversion Parameter)
1.5 (Attanasio et al. (2008))
Some College Male Wage (full-time work)
100(normalization)
High School or less Male Wage(full-time work)
70 (wage gap from CPS data)
Some College Female Wage (full-time work)
71 (gender-wage gap, Blau & Kahn (2017))
High School or less Female Wage(full-time work) 49.7 (gender-wage gap, Blau & Kahn (2017))
Part-time wage
Half of full time wage
for corresponding gender and education
ρ (Consumption Economies of Scale)
1.7
β (Discount Factor)
0.98
R (Gross Interest Rate)
1.03

Table 1.3: Population Vector (CPS Data)
High Men Low Men High Women Low Women
Numbers
0.48
0.52
0.36
0.64

Table 1.4: Parameter Estimates
Parameter
Estimates Standard Error
ση (Some college Man)
0.72
0.17
ση (HS Man)
1.53
0.81
ση (Some college Woman)
1.98
0.07
ση (HS Woman)
2.34
0.06
φ(Some college Man)
-1.56
0.17
φ(HS Man)
-1.21
0.13
φ(Some college Woman)
-1.03
0.12
φ(HS Woman)
0.23
0.50
σθ
0.72
0.03
σζ
0.96
0.07

Table 1.5: Husband’s Pareto Weights in Marriage Market Equilibrium
Legal
Regime
Mutual Consent, Title-based
Mutual Consent, Equitable
Unilateral, Title-based
Unilateral, Equitable

High Man,
High Man,
Low Man,
Low Man
High Woman Low Woman High Woman Low Woman
0.23
0.72
0.18
0.76
0.41
0.79
0.32
0.81
0.36
0.85
0.57
0.84
0.45
0.88
0.25
0.89
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Table 1.6: Model Fit
Variable
Data Moments Model Moments
Proportion full-time Some College Men
0.85
0.82
Proportion part-time Some College Men
0.11
0.15
Proportion full-time HS Men
0.78
0.78
Proportion part-time HS Men
0.16
0.19
Proportion full-time Some College Women
0.47
0.43
Proportion part-time Some College Women
0.31
0.30
Proportion full-time HS Women
0.37
0.43
Proportion part-time HS Women
0.29
0.31
Proportion divorced in 10 years from Marriage
0.24
0.20
Proportion single
0.11
0.11

Table 1.7: Simulation of Different Legal Regimes
Variable

Mutual, Mutual, Unilateral, Unilateral,
Title
Equitable
Title
Equitable
Porportion Married
0.95
0.89
0.99
0.89
Proportion assortatively matched
0.52
0.51
0.51
0.52
Proportion divorced in 10 yrs
0.28
0.20
0.36
0.31
Labor force Participation (Male)
0.97
0.95
0.96
0.96
Labor force Participation (Female)
0.78
0.77
0.79
0.69

Table 1.8: Welfare Loss by Legal Regime
Legal Regime
Mutual, Equitable
Unilateral, Title
Unilateral, Equitable

Utility Loss Relative to Mutual, Title
15%
16.8%
19.5%
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Table 1.9: Change in Correlation between Husband’s and Wife’s Completed Years of Schooling
due to Change in Legal Regime (from PSID Data)
Husband’s Years of Schooling
0.617∗∗∗
(0.04859)

Wife’s Years of Schooling
1(Unilateral) ∗ 1(Equitable)
*Wife’s Years of Schooling

-0.0275
(0.01796)

1(Unilateral) *Wife’s Years of Schooling

0.0591
(0.03700)

1(Equitable) *Wife’s Years of Schooling

-0.0624
(0.05016)

1(Unilateral)

-0.685
(0.4975)

1(Equitable)

0.866
(0.6626)
3323
0.383

N
R2

Note: Model controls for order of marriage, year of marriage, sex ratio in each education
category in year of marriage, state fixed effects and a linear time trend interacted with
state fixed effects. The sample has been restricted to third or lower order marriages
in White-headed households in non-community property states. The omitted category is
marriages formed in a mutual consent, title-based regime. Standard errors (clustered at state level)
in parentheses
Source: PSID, multiple waves
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 1.10: Property Division Laws and Asset Accumulation

1(Equitable)

Accumulated Asset in 1989
-3642.9∗
(20081.2)

Head’s Age in 1989

128.8
(117.64)
1919
0.467

N
R2

Note: Model controls for years of schooling of husband and wife, years elapsed
since marriage, year of marriage. The omitted category is title-based property
division regime. Standard errors (clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
Source: PSID, multiple waves
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

38

Table 1.11: Laws and Divorce Probability within 10 years from Marriage (from PSID Data)

1(Mutual Consent, Equitable or Community)

1(Divorce in 10 years)
-.0268∗∗
(0.0112)
-0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0009)

Age at Marriage

Order of Marriage

.0112
(0.0086)

Yrs. of Schooling (Husband)

-.0180∗∗∗
(.0027)

Yrs. of Schooling (Wife)

-.0087∗∗∗
( .0021)
7751
0.0482
0.2240

N
R2
Dep. Var. Mean

Note: Model controls for race and year of marriage fixed effects. The omitted category is
marriages formed in mutual consent title-based and marriages formed in unilateral and
title-based, equitable or community property regimes. Sample restricted to such marriages
that would have been in the same divorce and property division regime 10 years from formation.
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Chapter 2
Saving for Marriage Expenses and Early
Childhood Nutrition: Evidence from India
2.1

Introduction

Marriage is near-universal amongst adults in India. For instance, more than 97% of women
aged 25 years or more in the year 2005 had married at least once1 . Most women marry at a
relatively young age. The average age at marriage for ever-married women born in 1980 was
around 18 years.
Indian marriages are typically very expensive, and the widespread prevalence of the practice
of dowry2 makes daughters’ weddings especially expensive. These weddings could cost a
household more than six times its annual income (see Bloch et al. (2004)) or up to 68% of the
value of its total assets (see Rao (1993)). Sons’ weddings can be financed, at least partially, by
the dowry received from the bride, and hence are much less costly as compared to daughters’
weddings.
In this socio-economic environment, where most daughters marry, a majority of them at a
young age, it is natural for parents to consider the birth of a daughter to be a greater negative
shock to their lifetime income than the birth of a son. Further, poor households are known to
1

This number is based on my calculations from the IHDS data.
Dowry is a transfer at marriage from the bride or her family to the groom or his family. The opposite of this,
bride price, is rare in India (see Anderson (2007)).
2
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have limited access to credit markets. Hence, households could start saving early, long before
their daughter is of marriageable age. In very poor households, such savings could potentially
crowd out resources for the purchase of food and adversely affect nutritional outcomes of children in the family.
In this paper, I use data from the two waves of the India Human Development Survey to
provide evidence that supports the above hypothesis. I find that the reduction in household consumption expenditure per capita, both on all consumption goods and on foods, associated with
the presence of an additional daughter is greater than the corresponding reduction associated
with the presence of an additional son. This is suggestive of households with more daughters
saving more. Further, I find that the customary amount of expenses on a daughter’s wedding
is higher amongst “higher/forward caste” households than amongst “lower caste” households
at comparable levels of income and assets. This gap in the obligatory amount of a daughter’s
wedding expenses across the two caste categories is mirrored in the nutritional outcomes of
children, as measured by height-for-age z-scores, in the following way: The presence of an additional unmarried daughter aged 18 years or less is associated with a greater deterioration in
the nutritional outcomes of children aged 5 years or less in “higher” caste households as compared to the corresponding amount amongst their counterparts in “lower” caste households.
The differential worsening in nutritional outcomes across caste categories that I find is
fairly large in size. In absolute value, the presence of each additional daughter is associated
with a 0.33 standard deviation differential reduction in height-for-age z-scores across the caste
categories. To put the absolute value in perspective, it corresponds to about 135% of the heightfor-age differential between second-born Indian children and second-born African children, and
about 77% of the corresponding differential between third born children (see Jayachandran &
Pande (2017)).
The differential worsening of children’s nutritional outcomes across the caste categories
demonstrates two interesting patterns. First, the differential worsening is observed only amongst
children aged 5 years or less, and the association is weak or non-existent amongst older children. Second, the differential worsening of nutritional outcome is independent of the child’s
gender. These patterns are informative about the distribution of the financial burden to save for
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a daughter’s wedding amongst children in the family, and constitute the central contribution of
this paper. They indicate that the incidence of this burden on children depends on their age
and not on their gender. In view of the well-established link between height in early childhood
and future earnings potential (for instance, see Hoddinott et al. (2013), Case & Paxson (2008)),
these patterns suggest that all children, regardless of their gender, who grow up in poor families
that anticipate incurring high obligatory marriage expenses could have worse outcomes in later
life.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the background,
the related literature and the contribution of this paper. Section 2.3 describes the dataset used in
the analysis. Section 2.4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 presents the results of the
empirical analysis. Section 2.6 discusses potential policy implications of the results. Section
2.7 concludes.

2.2

Background, Related Literature and Contribution

Transfers at marriage, which form an important component of expenses at marriage, have been
studied by a strand in the economic literature that goes back at least to the seminal contribution
of Becker (2009), who conceptualized marital transfers as prices that equilibrate the marriage
market. More recently, Botticini & Siow (2003) suggest an alternative explanation for dowries,
namely, that they are a form of pre-mortem bequest rather than a price. In the Indian context,
Arunachalam & Logan (2016) provide evidence suggestive of dowries playing the role of both
prices and pre-mortem bequests.
Ethnographhic evidence (see Anderson (2007) for a survey) documents variation in the
direction and magnitude of marital transfers across societies and over time. This literature
documents the widespread prevalence of dowries—transfers from the bride to the groom at
marriage—in the Indian context. In the Indian subcontinent, dowries arose amongst Hindus
(see Gupta (2002), Botticini & Siow (2003)) but the practice has spread amongst Muslims
and other religious minorities over time (see Srinivas (1984), Ambrus et al. (2010), Waheed
(2009)).
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Some studies (for example, Rao (1993)) claim that dowry amounts in India have been rising over time, and Anderson (2003) provides a theory that suggests the hierarchical nature
of the caste system as an explanation. However, in the absence of reliable data on dowries,
possibly on account of illegality of the practice, claims of dowry inflation have been subject
to skepticism (see Logan & Arunachalam (2014)). Paucity of representative data and reliable
instruments also constrain empirical research on the effects of dowry in India. Nonetheless,
(plausible) claims that dowry motivates son-preferring behaviors (like sex-selective abortion,
infanticide and gender-differentiated investments in children) abound in the sociological and
economic literature (see Arnold et al. (1998), Miller (1981), Harris (1993), Das Gupta et al.
(2003)). The extraction of dowry3 has also been recognized as a motive behind crimes against
women, ranging from domestic violence to murder, both in the news media (for example, see
Gyan (2013), Singh (2019)) and in the scholarly literature (see Bloch & Rao (2002), Sekhri &
Storeygard (2014)).
A few papers in economics attempt to establish a causal connection between marital transfers and outcomes. For example, Brown (2009) finds evidence in China that a higher dowry
improves the bargaining power of the newlywed woman at her in-laws’ place.4 Ashraf et al.
(2016) find that the sensitivity of female enrollment to the INPRES school construction program in Indonesia varied by bride price traditions of ethnic groups. Similarly, Corno et al.
(2016) find evidence in Tanzania that the sensitivity of the probability of girls’ early marriage
and fertility to adverse rainfall shocks (during teenage years) varies by bride price traditions of
their ethnic group. In the Indian context, Bhalotra et al. (2016) find that an unexpected increase
in anticipated dowry payments due to a sudden and sharp rise in the price of gold (in 1980) is
reflected in increased girl relative to boy mortality amongst neonates and infants, and shorter
adult stature amongst surviving women. Interestingly, their results in respect of the adult stature
of surviving men are unstable across different specifications.
While Bhalotra et al. (2016) is the first study that establishes a plausible causal link between anticipated future marriage expenses and outcomes like mortality and adult stature, it
3

Anecdotally, a woman’s in-laws might continue to ask the woman and her family to pay additional amounts
as dowry, even after marriage.
4
Most societies that practise dowry are patrilocal (see Anderson (2007)).
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leaves open several important questions with potentially serious implications for the design
and targeting of policy. For example, at what age do we first see a reduction in children’s
height that eventually culminates in a shorter adult stature? Does a boy growing up in a family
with unmarried sister(s) fare any worse than a boy growing up in a family with no unmarried
sisters? Does a boy growing up with an unmarried sister fare any better than his unmarried
sister herself, whose future marriage is the very cause for strain on the family’s resources?
In other words, how is the burden of a daughter’s wedding distributed among children in the
family?
This paper contributes by filling in some of these gaps. First, I provide evidence that anticipated marriage expenses lead to the deterioration of nutritional outcomes of children in early
childhood, ie, the first five years of life. Second, my findings shed light on how the financial
burden to save for a daughter’s wedding is shared amongst children in the household. They
suggest that the incidence of this burden on children depends on their age and not on their gender. All children under five years of age, regardless of their gender, are adversely affected by
the anticipated marriage expenses of girls. By contrast, there are no effects on children who are
older than five years of age.
A striking feature of my findings is their gender-neutrality — the fact that both young boys
and girls are equally affected by the obligation to save for daughters’ marriages. This stands in
contrast to the findings of a large body of literature that has documented various son-preferring
behaviors in the Indian context (see Behrman & Deolalikar (1990), Rose (1999) and Sekhri &
Storeygard (2014) for gender-differentiated responses in intrahousehold allocation of resources
to negative income shocks; Clark (2000) and Jensen (2002) for differential fertility stopping
behavior; Oster (2009), Chakravarty et al. (2010), Jayachandran & Kuziemko (2011), Bharadwaj & Lakdawala (2013) and Barcellos et al. (2014) for gender differentiated investments in
children).
The findings of the current paper are important for the following two reasons: First, in view
of the well-established link between height and health in early childhood and future earnings
potential (Glewwe & Miguel (2007), Guven & Lee (2015), Strauss & Thomas (1998), Case &
Paxson (2008), Hoddinott et al. (2013)), these findings suggest that all children, regardless of
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their gender, who grow up in poor families that anticipate incurring high obligatory marriage
expenses could have worse economic outcomes (like wages, for example) in later life. Second,
my findings point out which demographic should be targeted by governmental welfare schemes,
like nutritional supplemental programs. They indicate that such programs should be targeted at
children, regardless of their gender, who happen to be below five years of age and are growing
up in families that, on account of social custom, anticipate incurring high marriage expenses
and have a large number of unmarried daughters.

2.3

The Data and Descriptive Statistics

I use data from the two waves of the India Human Development Survey (see Desai et al. (2005)
and Desai et al. (2015)). The India Human Development Survey (IHDS hereafter) is a twowave panel of a representative sample of Indian households. Data for the first wave, ie, IHDS1, were collected in 2004-05, and data for the second wave, ie, IHDS-II, were collected in
2011-12. IHDS-I surveyed a nationally representative sample of 41,554 households. IHDS-II
reinterviewed 83% of these households, and had a replacement sample of 2,134 households.
The IHDS contains detailed information on individual-level characteristics (such as age,
education, marital status, labor supply, labor and non-labor income, etc.) of all members in the
the household. It also contains rich information about socio-economic attributes of the household like assets possessed, monthly consumption expenditure and demographic characteristics
of the household like religion and caste. In particular, IHDS-II allows the head of the household to self-identify as belonging to one of the following six broad caste categories: Brahmin,
other forward but not Brahmin, Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), Other Backward
Castes (OBC) and Others. For my analysis, I use this six-fold categorization to create a twofold categorization of caste, namely, the upper/forward castes and the lower castes. In this
categorization, the “upper/forward” caste category comprises the Brahmins and other forward
castes. All other caste categories are lumped into the “lower castes”. Thus, the lower castes are
comprised primarily of SCs, STs and OBCs, which are caste groups that are officially recognized as backward castes by the Indian government and are entitled to benefits under affirmative
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action policies enshrined in the Indian Constitution.
The IHDS contains two further pieces of information that make it uniquely suited for the
current analysis. First, it contains information on usual marriage expenses in the social group
that the household belongs to. To be precise, the interviewed woman in each household was
asked the following question: “In your community (jati)5 for a family like yours, at the time of
the marriage, how much money is usually spent by the girl’s (boy’s) family?” The interviewer
was asked to probe for a single number in each case but was allowed to accept a range provided
by the respondent. While the responses to this question are indicative of social norms relating
to marriage expenses as perceived by the household, they are presumably noisy indicators of
the incidence of the financial burden (on account of marriage expenses) on the household. This
is because a household possibly has some flexibility to deviate from the social norm. On the
other hand, differences in average usual marriage expenses at a more aggregate level (like caste
category) are plausibly driven by differences in social norms across these broader groups, and
hence, this difference is likely to be mirrored in group differences in outcomes. Based on this
logic, I use variation in average usual expenses across broad caste categories to identify the
effects of marriage expenses on nutritional outcomes.
The second crucial piece of information provided by the IHDS consist of height measurements of children. IHDS-I provides height measurements for children aged 0-5 and 8-11 years
while IHDS-II provides height measurements for all children up to 18 years of age at the time of
the survey. I use the information on children’s heights to compute their height-for-age z-scores,
which is the measure of nutritional outcome recommended by the World Health Organization
(WHO) to monitor child development in any population. The height-for-age z-score of a child
is calculated with respect to an international reference population6 in the following way:

Height-for-age z-score = (Height of child − M )/SD

where M and SD denote the median and standard deviation of height among children of
5

Jati is usually understood to refer to the sub-caste, which is an endogamous social group.
The international reference population consists of a sample of healthy children drawn from six different
countries, namely, the United States of America, Norway, Oman, India, Ghana and Brazil.
6
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the same gender and age (measured in months) in the reference population. Thus, if a child has
a z-score of -1, it implies that its height is 1 standard deviation below the height of the median
child (of the same gender) in the reference population.
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics. We note that the average child aged 5 years or less
is close to stunted. (Stunting is defined as a height-for-age z-score less than -2.). Consistent
with women marrying at a relatively young age, the average age at marriage for women is
around 17 years. Marriage expenses are high relative to income, especially for the bottom 25
percentiles of the income distribution (see Table 2.2). Note also that the “Forward Castes”
have costlier marriages at similar levels of income. Around 25% of the sample households are
Forward Caste (see Table 2.3) and there is some variation in the number of unmarried daughters
aged 18 or less across households (see Table 2.4). These variations in the data are crucial for
identification of the model presented in Section 2.4 below.

2.4

The Methodology

As mentioned before, the upper caste households customarily spend more money on their
daughters’ weddings as compared to their lower caste counterparts. In order to check if this is
robust to the introduction of controls for demographic characteristics, I specify the following
model:

Yit = β0 + β1 1(Forward Caste)i + β2 Xit + it

(2.1)

where i and t index a household and time period respectively, and Yit is the customary
amount of money that is spent marrying off a daughter in a household of the relevant social
class and caste as declared by the interviewed woman and X is a vector of controls that includes
household income, assets index and the wave of the panel.
If my hypothesis that parents save money for their daughters’ wedding is true we must
observe that all else equal, within the set of families that have the same number of children,
families with more unmarried daughters of marriageable age spend less on consumption. This
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can be tested by running the following regression:
Cit = γ0 + γ1 Incomeit + γ2 No. of childrenit
(2.2)
+ γ3 No. of daughtersit + γ4 Xit + it
where Cit denotes monthly consumption expenditure per capita.
Finally, I must tease out the causal effect of dowry on the nutritional outcome of children.
I use a difference-in-differences model for the purpose. Consider potential outcomes given by
the following two equations.

Ni,U C(ni ≥0) = ni αU C + γU C + δni + Xi β + i,U C(ni )

(2.3)

Ni,LC(ni ≥0) = ni αLC + γLC + δni + Xi β + i,LC(ni )

(2.4)

where Ni,U C(ni ≥0) denotes the nutritional outcome of child i if (s)he lives in an upper/forward
caste (UC) household which has a total of ni unmarried females aged 18 years or less while
Ni,LC(ni ≥0) denotes the nutritional outcome of the same child if (s)he lives in a lower caste
(LC) household with the same number of unmarried females aged 18 or less. The potential
nutritional outcome is allowed to depend on the following:
1. If i lives in an upper (lower) caste household, (s)he is potentially “treated” with high
(low) marriage expenses. The effect of living in an upper (lower) caste household with
a total of one unmarried female aged 18 or less is denoted by αU C (αLC ). The intensity
of “treatment” depends on the total number of unmarried females aged 18 or less, hence
the effect of treatment for a child living in an upper (lower) caste household is ni αU C
(ni αLC ).
2. A caste-fixed effect (denoted by γj , j ∈ {U C, LC}). This term accounts for unobservables unrelated to marriage expenses that could affect nutrition and could potentially
vary by caste. Plausible examples include dietary patterns, sanitary practices, the disease
environment, etc.
3. A “number of daughters” effect (denoted by δni ) that does not vary across the two caste
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categories. This accounts for the fact that families that have different numbers of unmarried daughters of marriageable age may have different “preferences” that might be
consequential for nutrition of a child in the family.
4. An idiosyncratic component .
My objective is to identify αU C . A lower bound for |αU C | is identified in the following manner. Taking a single difference as below eliminates all the marriage-expense-neutral channels
through which caste and omitted variables correlated with caste affect nutrition.



E Ni,U C(ni =k+1) − Ni,U C(ni =k) = αU C + [δk+1 − δk ]

(2.5)



E Ni,LC(ni =k+1) − Ni,LC(ni =k) = αLC + [δk+1 − δk ]

(2.6)

(2.5) – (2.6) yields
h
 
i
E Ni,U C(ni =k+1) − Ni,U C(ni =k) − Ni,LC(ni =k+1) − Ni,LC(ni =k) = αU C − αLC

(2.7)

Since the intensity of treatment for the upper castes is greater than the intensity of treatment
for the lower castes, I assume that |αU C | > |αLC |. Under this assumption, |αU C − αLC | is
lower bound for |αU C |. The crucial assumption here that facilitates identification is that the
part of the effect of the number of unmarried females (aged 18 or less) that is independent of
marriage expenses does not vary by caste. In other words, δni does not have a caste subscript
in equations (2.3) and (2.4). Empirically, I identify the coefficient of interest by running the
following regression.
Nij = α0 + α1 U mfj + 1(Forward Caste)j + α2 U mfj ∗ 1(Forward Caste)j
(2.8)
+ α3 1(Female)ij + α4 Xij + ij
where Nij refers to the nutritional outcome (as measured by the height-for-age Z-score) of
child i living in household j, U mfj denotes the number of unmarried girls aged 18 or less
in household j and 1(.) denotes the indicator function. Notice that caste is a household-level
characteristic.
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Next, I check if the differential worsening of nutritional outcomes (consequent upon the
presence of an additional daughter) across castes differs by the gender of the child. To that end,
I use the following triple difference specification:

Nij = α1 U mfj + α2 U mfj ∗ 1(Forward Caste)j
+ α3 U mfj ∗ 1(Forward Caste)j ∗ 1(Female)ij
+ α4 1(Forward Caste)j ∗ 1(Female)ij + α5 1(Forward Caste)j

(2.9)

+ α6 1(Female)ij + α7 1(Female)ij ∗ U mfj
+ α8 Xj + ij
Here, the coefficient of interest is α3 . A negative estimate of α3 would indicate discrimination
against girls.
There is, however, an endogeneity concern with the above specifications. It is possible that
household-specific unobservables associated with the presence of a certain number of daughters
vary systematically across the caste categories. In other words, it could be that δni has a caste
subscript. If that is the case, α
b2 obtained by estimating equation (2.8) may produce a biased
estimate of αU C . In an attempt to address this concern, I specify the following household
fixed-effects model.
Nijt = αj + α2 U mfjt ∗ 1(Forward Caste)j + α3 U mfjt + α4 1(Female)i + α5 Xijt + ijt
(2.10)
Here, t indexes time and αj denotes household fixed effects. In equation (2.10), α2 is identified
off “within-household” variation in the number of daughters, and hence, estimates thereof are
not subject to the endogeneity concern mentioned above.

2.5

Results

I present estimates of equation (2.1) in Table 2.5. The dependent variable here is the usual
lower or upper limit of expenses on a daughter’s marriage (as reported by the interviewee).
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We notice that controlling for assets, the wave of survey, location and state fixed effects, girls’
marriage expenses are higher amongst the so-called upper/forward castes at comparable levels
of income. This holds both for the entire income distribution (see columns 1 and 2) as well as
for households belonging to the bottom 25% of the income distribution (see columns 3 and 4).
Table 2.6 presents estimates of equation (2.2). A comparison of columns (1) and (2) indicate that holding the number of persons in the household fixed, the presence of an additional
unmarried female aged 18 or less is associated with a 8% decrease in monthly consumption
expenditure per capita while the corresponding decline associated with the presence of an additional male aged 18 or less is only 5%. Column (3) controls for both the number of unmarried
females aged 18 or less and the number of males aged 18 or less. We notice that all else equal,
one more unmarried girl aged 18 or less is associated with a 9.43% decline in consumption per
capita while the corresponding decline associated with a male aged 18 or less is only 6.55%.
These results are consistent with households with more daughters saving up for their daughters’
marriages and the presence of an additional son imposing no such burden on the household.
Further, Table 2.7 shows that food consumption expenditures show a similar pattern for the
bottom 25% of the income distribution.
Table 2.8 presents estimates of equation (2.8). In column 1, the sample is restricted to
children who are five years of age or younger. Notice that the estimate of the coefficient on the
interaction of the number of unmarried daughters aged 18 years or younger and the indicator for
forward caste is negative and statistically significant at the 1 % level. The estimated coefficient
is interpreted as follows: The presence of an additional unmarried girl aged 18 or less in the
household is associated with a 0.33 standard deviation higher reduction in height-for-age zscores in Forward Caste households as compared to the corresponding reduction amongst lower
caste households. However, this does not hold for children over 5 years of age (see columns 2
and 3 of Table 2.8).
In terms of magnitude, the 0.33 standard deviation differential reduction in height-for-age
z-scores across the caste categories for each additional girl child, is fairly large. To put the
absolute value in perspective, it corresponds to about 135% of the height-for-age differential
between second-born Indian children and second-born African children, and about 77% of the
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corresponding differential between third born children (see Column 5, Table 2 in Jayachandran
& Pande (2017)).
Next, I check if the differential worsening of nutritional outcomes across the two caste
categories varies by gender of the child. Table 2.9 presents estimates of equation (2.9). If
the differential worsening is more (less) acute for girls than boys, the coefficient of the triple
interaction term would be negative (positive) and statistically significant. We notice that for
each age group, this coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that
the differential worsening of nutritional outcomes across the two caste categories does not vary
by gender of the child.
With regard to the results presented in Tables 2.8 and 2.9, two comments are in order.
First, the sample, in each case, restricted to households belonging to roughly the bottom 25
percentiles of the income distribution. It is only amongst these very poor households that
the differential worsening described above is observed. For richer household, this is not the
case. This is consistent with Engel’s Law7 . Second, all specifications control for a rich set of
covariates that include the age of the child (measured in months), the total number of persons in
the household, annual household income, an index of asset possession, rural or urban location,
religion, and state fixed effects. Importantly, they also control for two other variables, namely,
the order of birth of the child and the type of sanitation facility in the household, that have been
shown to affect nutritional outcomes in early childhood (see Jayachandran & Pande (2017),
Geruso & Spears (2018)). Thus, the coefficients estimated are contaminated neither by birth
order effects nor by sanitation effects.
Nonetheless, the results described above are subject to potential endogeneity concerns.
First, it is possible that the two caste groups respond differently (in terms of intrahousehold
allocation of food) to increases in the number of children. If that were true, the effects identified above are driven not by variation in marriage expenses across the caste categories but by
their differential response to increases in the number of children. However, in that case, we
should observe a differential worsening of nutritional outcomes across caste groups associated
with the presence of additional boys aged 18 years or less, similar to the differential worsening
7

Engel’s Law states that the expenditure share of food goes down at higher levels of income. Thus, at higher
levels of income, income elasticity of food demand is expected to be low.
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across caste groups associated with the presence of additional girls aged 18 years or less. Table
2.10 shows that this is not true in the data. In each column, the coefficient on the interaction
between the number of males below 18 years of age and the indicator for forward/upper caste
is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Second, there is the concern that household-specific unobservables associated with the presence of a certain number of daughters varies systematically across the caste categories. In other
words, it is possible δni ’s in equations (2.3) and (2.4) have caste subscripts. If that is the case,
the estimates reported above could be biased. To address this concern, I estimate the household
fixed-effects model specified by equation (2.10). Here, identification (of the coefficient on the
interaction of the number of daughters with the indicator for forward caste) is achieved by using
“within-household” variation in the number of daughters in the household across the two waves
of the panel. Estimates are presented in Table 2.11. Notice that in column 1, the coefficient
on the stated interaction term is negative and statistically significant. Column 2 implements
the robustness check described in the previous paragraph, adapted for the current specification.
Here, the following change is made to the set of explanatory variables: The number of unmarried females below the age of 18 (used in column 1) is replaced by the number of males
below 18 years of age in the household. Consistent with the results presented in Table 2.10, we
notice from column 2 of Table 2.11 that the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. These robustness checks increase confidence in the main results
of this paper.

2.6

Policy Implications

The findings of this paper have potentially interesting implications for the design and targeting of governmental welfare schemes. For example, consider the policy debate (in India) on
whether the government should retain its current system of making direct food transfers to the
poor or replace it with cash transfers (see Dreze & Khera (2015), Kotwal et al. (2011)). My
findings suggest that if the government were to replace food transfers with cash transfers, families that have a large number of daughters and that belong to caste groups that (by custom) have
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to spend more money on daughters’ weddings could end up saving the transferred cash. In such
families, nutritional outcomes of young children could deteriorate further if food transfers were
to be replaced with cash transfers.
Second, in respect of designing nutritional supplementation programs for children, my findings indicate that such programs should be targeted at young children (aged 5 years or less) who
grow up in families that are customarily required to incur high (daughter’s) marriage expenses
and live with a lot of siblings of marriageable age. However, there is no merit in prioritizing
girls over boys since children of both genders suffer equally in terms of nutritional outcomes.

2.7

Conclusion and Future Directions

Using data from the two rounds of the India Human Development Survey, a rich nationally
representative panel from India, I document that daughters’ marriages are more expensive than
sons’ marriages. Moreover, at comparable levels of income and wealth, daughters’ marriages
in upper/forward Caste households are more expensive as compared to daughters’ marriages in
lower caste households. The gap in the obligatory amount of a daughter’s wedding expenses
across the two caste groups is mirrored in the nutritional outcomes of children, as measured by
height-for-age z-scores, in the following way: The presence of an additional unmarried daughter aged 18 years or less is associated with a greater deterioration in the nutritional outcomes
of children aged 5 years or less in “higher” caste households as compared to the corresponding
amount amongst their counterparts in “lower” caste households. Further, the differential worsening of nutritional outcomes across caste groups does not vary by sex of the child but does
vary by age. Children appear most susceptible to the reduction in height in early childhood. As
one would expect the result holds only for households with incomes below the 25th percentile
of the income distribution. These findings, to the best of my knowledge, are the first to suggest
that marriage expenses might lead to a deterioration in nutritional outcomes in early childhood,
and that all children exposed to the shock in the early years of their lives are vulnerable to it
regardless of their sex. In view of the well-established fact that early childhood height predicts
later life outcomes, high marriage expenses could be a cause for lower earnings in later life.
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The findings of this paper raise a few interesting questions with implications for the design
of policy. For instance, why is the effect on nutritional outcomes different for younger children
as compared to that for older children? Is it a consequence of younger children being discriminated against by parents in the event of a negative shock to lifetime income, or is it because
younger children are more sensitive to small variations in food intake or nutritional content
thereof? What are the parental beliefs in respect of the connection between childhood height
and later life outcomes? The exploration of such questions is left for future research.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics (IHDS-1 & 2)
Mean

Standard Error

Observations

Height-for-age z-score
(children ≤ 60 months)
1(Female)

-1.933

2.075

16224

0.4897

0.499

386635

Order of birth

2.559

1.662

140816

Woman’s age at marriage
for women ≤ 30

17.367

3.335

114496

Monthly consumption per capita

997.310

754.479

75229

No. of persons

5.24

2.455

79275

No. unmarried females aged 0-18

0.958

1.125

80034

No. of males aged 0-18

1.115

.0139

52537

Asset Index

12.799

6.107

80013

1(Forward Caste)

0.278

0.448

79878

Max. amt. spent in a girl’s wedding
(2004 Rupees)

124867.008

106402.885

78117

Min. amt. spent in a girl’s wedding
(2004 Rupees)

94711.046

81742.514

78129

Max. amt. spent in a son’s wedding
(2004 Rupees)

80783.035

69000.351

78141

Min. amt. spent in a son’s wedding
(2004 Rupees)

60468.411

51364.868

78159
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Table 2.2: Customary Marriage Expenses (2004 Rupees) for a Daughter by Caste Category
(1st quartile of Income distribution)

Caste category

Upper bound
Mean
(se)

Lower bound
Mean
(se)

Forward Castes

105222
(3406.48)

83295
(2836.12)

Other Castes

74541
(1450.38)

56747
(926.2953)

Source: IHDS 1 & 2, household weights used

Table 2.3: Caste Categories (IHDS-1 households): Weighted Percentage

Item
Per cent
Brahmin
4.56
Forward/General (except Brahmin)
20.77
Other Backward Castes (OBC)
42.20
Scheduled Castes (SC)
22.89
Scheduled Tribes (ST)
8.05
Others
1.53
Total
100
Source: Sample restricted to panel households

Table 2.4: Number of Unmarried Females aged 0-18 in a household: Weighted Percentage

Number
0
1
2
3
4
≥5
Total

Per cent
42.43
32.12
15.66
6.43
2.26
1.1
100

Note: Sample restricted to panel households
Panel household weights used
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Table 2.5: Determinants of Girls’ Marriage Expenses (Customary Minimum and Maximum in
2004 Rupees)
(1)
Min. Expenses
21421.5∗∗∗
(1855.6)

(2)
Max. Expenses
28476.6∗∗∗
(2386.6)

(3)
Min. Expenses
17527.0∗∗∗
(2296.4)

(4)
Max. Expenses
24178.0∗∗∗
(2910.3)

1(Wave 2)

13556.7∗∗∗
(1193.7)

26000.9∗∗∗
(1723.1)

13336.8∗∗∗
(1355.3)

24029.8∗∗∗
(2322.9)

1(Forward Caste)*1(Wave 2)

-1975.0
(2429.4)
0.155∗∗∗
(0.01074)

-5071.5∗
(3077.8)
0.205∗∗∗
(0.01398)

965.1
(4285.6)
-0.391∗∗∗
(0.1263)

-2722.7
(5080.5)
-0.345∗∗
(0.1501)

Assets Index

4586.2∗∗∗
(115.38)

6006.1∗∗∗
(153.35)

3938.8∗∗∗
(165.66)

5420.4∗∗∗
(245.41)

1(Urban)

-2490.9
(1684.0)
75732
0.342

-4181.9∗
(2218.3)
75731
0.361

-868.4
(1951.9)
18956
0.270

-2862.0
(2917.0)
18938
0.291

All

All

1-25th %ile

1-25th%ile

1(Forward Caste)

Annual hhd. Income

N
R2
Sample:
Income distribution

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions control for state fixed effects and have a constant
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Table 2.6: Variation of Log Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure with Number of
Unmarried Daughters aged 0-18, Household Fixed Effects Model
(2)
ln(COPC)

(3)
ln(COPC)
-0.0943∗∗∗
(0.009764)

-0.0472∗∗∗
(0.01088)

-0.0655∗∗∗
(0.01103)

0.00000347∗∗∗
(7.313e-07)

0.00000372∗∗∗
(7.491e-07)

0.00000309∗∗∗
(7.475e-07)

No. of Persons

-0.0560∗∗∗
(0.005063)

-0.0636∗∗∗
(0.005008)

-0.0343∗∗∗
(0.006145)

Wave of Survey

0.232∗∗∗
(0.01073)
35273
291.3
0.297

0.231∗∗∗
(0.01072)
35273
260.2
0.291

0.229∗∗∗
(0.01072)
35273
237.1
0.304

1-50th %ile

1-50th %ile

1-50th %ile

No. unmarried females 0-18

(1)
ln(COPC)
-0.0807∗∗∗
(0.009707)

No. of males 0-18

Annual hhd. income

N
F
R2
Sample:
Income distribution:

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions are estimated using household fixed effects. In column 3, the coefficients
on the first two rows are statistically different from one another at the 5% level.
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Table 2.7: Variation of Log Monthly Per Capita Food Consumption Expenditure with Number
of Unmarried Daughters aged 0-18

No. unmarried girls 0-18

(1)
ln(FCOPC)
-0.0467∗∗∗
(0.003687)

(2)
ln(FCOPC)

(3)
ln(FCOPC)
-0.0693∗∗∗
(0.004238)

-0.0286∗∗∗
(0.004395)

-0.0579∗∗∗
(0.004789)

-0.0708∗∗∗
(0.002656)

-0.0767∗∗∗
(0.002573)

-0.0464∗∗∗
(0.003415)

0.000000638
(7.045e-07)

0.000000779
(7.132e-07)

0.000000627
(7.006e-07)

0.117∗∗∗
(0.008267)
18012
0.386

0.115∗∗∗
(0.008305)
18012
0.381

0.113∗∗∗
(0.008232)
18012
0.394

1-25th %ile

1-25th %ile

1-25th %ile

No. males 0-18

No. of persons

Hhd. Income

Wave of Survey
N
R2
Sample:
Income distribution:

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions control for religion and caste category fixed effects. In column 3,
the coefficients on the first two rows are statistically different from one another
at the 5% level.
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Table 2.8: Variation of Height-for-age Z scores of children with Number of Unmarried Daughters aged 0-18, Sample restricted to very poor households
(1)
Height-for-age
Z Score
0.0784
(0.06745)

(2)
Height-for-age
Z Score
0.0456
(0.06479)

(3)
Height-for-age
Z Score
-0.0406
(0.04429)

1(Forward Caste)

0.597∗∗∗
(0.1817)

0.217
(0.1934)

0.222
(0.1366)

No. of unmarried girls 0-18*1(Forward Caste)

-0.329∗∗∗
(0.09336)

-0.0756
(0.1000)

-0.0666
(0.08295)

1(Female)

-0.0545
(0.1122)
3289
0.0457

-0.0181
(0.1006)
2458
0.0911

-0.0461
(0.06646)
2749
0.0934

≤ 60

61 − 110

111 − 228

No. of unmarried girls 0-18

N
R2
Sample:
Age in months

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions are weighted using panel household weights. All regressions control for order of birth,
age in months, no. of persons in the household, household income, asset index, rural or urban location,
religion, type of toilet dummies, dummy for having a bank account, education of highest educated male
and female aged 21 or more and state fixed effects. All regressions have a constant. Standard errors
are clustered at the PSU level. In all cases sample restricted to households with annual income
between 3500 and 18500 (2004) Indian Rupees, which roughly corresponds to the bottom 25%
of the income distribution.
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Table 2.9: Checking for discrimination against girls (DDD Model)
(1)
Height-for-age
Z Score
0.0764
(0.08609)

(2)
Height-for-age
Z Score
0.0223
(0.08242)

(3)
Height-for-age
Z Score
0.0443
(0.06410)

1(Forward Caste)

0.588∗∗∗
(0.2198)

0.217
(0.2060)

0.264∗
(0.1439)

1(Female)

-0.0397
(0.1936)

0.0611
(0.1753)

0.251∗∗
(0.1245)

No. of unmarried girls 0-18*1(Forward Caste)

-0.278∗∗
(0.1373)

0.0921
(0.1487)

0.00191
(0.1204)

1(Forward Caste)*1(Female)

-0.00194
(0.4146)

-0.203
(0.3301)

-0.275
(0.2544)

No. of unmarried girls 0-18*1(Female)

0.000509
(0.1072)

0.0119
(0.09247)

-0.173∗∗
(0.08049)

No. of unmarried girls 0-18*1(Female)
*1(Forward Caste)

-0.0717
(0.2123)

-0.188
(0.1975)

-0.00505
(0.1628)

3289
0.0458

2458
0.0945

2763
0.0984

≤ 60

61 − 110

111 − 228

No. of unmarried girls 0-18

N
R2
Sample:
Age in months

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions are weighted using panel household weights. All regressions control for order of birth,
age in months, no. of persons in the household, household income, asset index, rural or urban location,
religion, type of toilet dummies, dummy for having a bank account, education of highest educated male
and female aged 21 or more and state fixed effects. All regressions have a constant. Standard errors are
clustered at the PSU level. In all cases sample restricted to households with annual income between
3500 and 18500 (2004) Indian Rupees, which roughly corresponds to the bottom 25%
of the income distribution.
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Table 2.10: Placebo Specification: Variation of Height-for-age Z scores of children with Number of Males aged 0-18
(1)
Height-for-age
Z Score
0.0152
(0.06779)

(2)
Height-for-age
Z Score
-0.0686
(0.07046)

(3)
Height-for-age
Z Score
-0.0713
(0.05632)

1(Forward Caste)

-0.0607
(0.2095)

-0.119
(0.2093)

0.0393
(0.1567)

No. of males aged 0-18 *1(Forward Caste)

0.144
(0.1209)

0.130
(0.1157)

0.0632
(0.08562)

1(Female)

0.0158
(0.1069)
3289
0.0425

-0.0222
(0.09925)
2458
0.0918

-0.147∗∗
(0.07323)
2749
0.0935

No. of males aged 0-18

N
R2

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: All regressions are weighted using panel household weights. All regressions control for order of birth,
age in months, no. of persons in the household, household income, asset index, rural or urban location,
religion, type of toilet dummies, dummy for having a bank account, education of highest educated male
and female aged 21 or more and state fixed effects. All regressions have a constant. Standard errors
are clustered at the PSU level. In all cases sample restricted to households with annual income between
3500 and 18500 (2004) Indian Rupees.
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Table 2.11: Variation of Height-for-age Z scores (of children 10 years or less) with Number
of Unmarried Daughters aged 0-18 (Household Fixed Effects), Sample restricted to very poor
households
(1)
Height-for-age
Z-score
No. of Unmarried Females 0-18
0.490
(0.3243)

-0.902∗∗∗
(0.2303)

No. of Males 0-18

No. of Unmarried Females 0-18
*1(Forward Caste)

-1.023∗
(0.5904)

No. of Males 0-18
*1(Forward Caste)
Hhd. Fixed Effects
N
F
R2

(2)
Height-for-age
Z-score

1.035
(0.9110)
Yes
5074
5.152
0.0703

Yes
5074
6.529
0.0768

Standard errors in parentheses
Source: IHDS-1 & 2
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Both regressions control for gender, order of birth, age in months, no. of persons in the household,
household income, asset index, dummy for having a bank account, education of highest educated
male and female aged 21 or more. In both cases sample is restricted to households with annual income
between 6000 and 18000 (2004) Indian Rupees. Standard errors clustered at the PSU level. Both
regressions are weighted using household weights.
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Chapter 3
Commitment and Matching in the
Marriage Market
(with Marcus Berliant)

3.1

Introduction

The dominant paradigm in the marriage-matching literature considers marriage market equilibrium under Binding Agreements in the Marriage Market(BAMM). In the typical model of
the marriage market (for instance, see Chiappori et al. (2018), Chiappori et al. (2017), Gayle
& Shephard (2019)), the division of the marital surplus is negotiated at the time of marriage. It
is assumed that the contract reached in the marriage market is binding upon the couple, i.e., it
cannot be breached or re-negotiated under any state of the world that may occur in future. In
other words, there is full commitment within marriage.
An empirically testable implication of BAMM is that unanticipated changes in laws governing exit from marriage, i.e., divorce, have no impact on behavior within marriage. However,
this does not hold in the data. For example, Voena (2015) finds that change in divorce and property division laws in the United States reduced female labor force participation and increased
rates of asset accumulation in marriages that had formed before the change in laws. Similarly,
empirical evidence suggests that policy-induced changes in spousal incomes change household
expenditure patterns (for example, see Lundberg et al. (1997)) — a finding that is at odds with
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couples having reached binding agreements in the marriage market.
While the empirical evidence is not consistent with BAMM, it can be rationalized using
the Bargaining In Marriage(BIM) hypothesis. According to BIM, married couples play a cooperative game in each period. Given the threat points (whether internal as in Lundberg &
Pollak (1993) or exit threats as in Voena (2015)) of this game, married couples attain efficient
outcomes in each period of marriage, which can change if threat points are affected by exogenous changes in policy, examples of which include legal changes and government-administered
welfare programs that affect relative spousal incomes.
The BAMM and BIM assumptions also entail potentially different marriage market equilibria, and have potentially different welfare implications. For instance, with transferable utility,
any stable matching under BAMM yields the highest total utility (to all players) amongst all
possible matchings. In other words, a stable matching under BAMM and transferable utility
is utilitarian efficient. However, this does not necessarily hold under BIM. As Pollak (2019)
demonstrates, the set of stable matchings under BIM do not necessarily coincide with the set of
stable matchings under BAMM. In particular, he illustrates that the BAMM and BIM equilibria
can be distinct.
If the notion of marriage market equilibrium in a BIM setting is stability, the appropriate
algorithm to find the equilibrium/equilibria is the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This is the route
taken by Pollak (2019). However, the few empirical papers that have tried to predict real world
matches using the Gale-Shapley algorithm (see Hitsch et al. (2010), Banerjee et al. (2013), Lee
(2009)) have failed to replicate patterns of assortative matching on several important dimensions. These results cast doubt on whether Gale-Shapley is the appropriate algorithm to use
in order to find marriage market equilibria. Further, they leave open the possibility that the
marriage market equilibrium under BIM is identical to the marriage market equilibrium under
BAMM — a possibility, which, in our opinion, should be a subject of theoretical and empirical
research.
In this paper, we explore the theoretical aspect of the problem. To be precise, we pose the
following question: Using a matching algorithm different from the Gale-Shapley algorithm, can
we implement the stable matching under BAMM (with transferable utility) even under BIM?
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An obvious candidate for implementing the BAMM assignment in the BIM world is the top
trading cycles algorithm, which, in contrast to the Gale-Shapley algorithm, produces a Pareto
efficient matching. We show that if agents on one side of the market are sufficiently sensitive to
matches relative to the other side, if the more sensitive side can be ranked by sensitivity, and if
preferences over members of the opposite sex are hierarchical, the top trading cycles algorithm
results in a utilitarian efficient matching. As is obvious, utilitarian efficiency is achieved at the
cost of stability — a tension that has been well-recognized in the literature (see Lee & Yariv
(2018) for a recent example).
The exercise in the current paper is, in spirit, similar to the familiar second welfare theorem
in general equilibrium theory (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)), which provides conditions under
which a Pareto optimal allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium (with taxes
and transfers). In our setting, the counterpart to a Pareto optimal allocation is a stable matching under BAMM, which happens to be belong to the core of the assignment game; while the
counterpart to decentralization using prices (as in the second welfare theorem) is the “decentralization” using the top trading cycles algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the economic
environment. Section 3.3 presents alternative desirable properties of a marriage market equilibrium. Section 3.4 discusses implementation of the utilitarian efficient assignment under BIM.
Section 3.5 concludes with a brief discussion. All proofs are placed in the appendix.

3.2

The Economic Environment

There are a finite and equal number of men and women in the market. Formally, let M and W
denote the set of men and women respectively and let |M| = |W| = N , where |X| denotes the
cardinality of the set X. Men and women play the following two-stage game: In the first stage,
men and women match with one another. We assume that the matching is simultaneous, not
sequential. In the second stage, matched couples play a cooperative game. In particular, each
married couple decides on public and private consumption within marriage.
We assume that individual preferences over private and public consumption goods within

67

marriage are such that utility is transferable within any couple. Formally, let {m }m∈M , {w
}w∈W denote individual preference orderings over bundles of private and public consumption
goods. We assume that these orderings are such that for any m ∈ M, w ∈ W, there exist cardinalizations, denoted by Um and Uw , that represent m and w such that the utility possibility
set is given by:
U = {(Um , Uw ) ∈ R2 : Um + Uw ≤ sm,w }.

(3.1)

where sm,w denotes the utility surplus produced if man m were to marry woman w. We assume
that sm,w > 0 ∀m ∈ M, w ∈ W. Thus, utility is transferable within each household.
While we shall not specify the household game that gives rise to the Pareto frontiers described here, we point out two important facts. First, it is well-known that (generalized) quasilinear preference orderings satisfy the transferable utility property (see Bergstrom (1989), Chiappori (2017)). Second, transferability of utility does not require the Pareto frontier to be a
hyperplane for every cardinalization of preferences. However, transferability of utility requires
that there exist a cardinalization of preferences such that the Pareto frontier is a hyperplane as
described above (see Bergstrom & Varian (1985), Chiappori (2017)). In our context, Um and
Uw are such well-chosen cardinalizations.
The primitives of the economic environment depend on whether we assume BIM or BAMM.
Under BAMM, the primitives of the two-stage problem are given by the objects < M, W, S >,
where S is a N XN utility-surplus matrix, whose m, w -th element, denoted by sm,w , is the utility surplus if the couple (m, w) were to be formed. Further, we normalize the utility surplus
from non-marriage to zero for each individual. By contrast, the primitives of the problem under
M
W
M
W
BIM are given by the following objects: < M, W, UBIM
, UBIM
>, where UBIM
(UBIM
) is an
W
N XN matrix whose m, w-th element, denoted by uM
m,w (um,w ), gives the payoff in marriage

that will accrue to man m (woman w) if he (she) were to marry woman w (man m). These
payoffs are the outcome of bargaining that would happen in marriage, were couple (m, w) to
be formed. Moreover, the outcome of the bargaining game is correctly foreseen by all participants in the marriage market. Further, we assume that the anticipated outcome of the bargaining game induces a strict preference ordering over the set of men. Formally, for any w,
W
0
uW
m,w 6= um0 ,w whenever m 6= m . Finally, in order to ensure comparability with BAMM, we
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M
W
set UBIM
+ UBIM
= S.

The solution under BAMM consists of the following two objects: an assignment/matching
of women to men1 and a utility imputation vector for all possible couples that determine how
the marital surplus will be split. Formally, the solution under BAMM consists of ABAM M and
IBAM M where ABAM M is a one-to-one onto mapping such that ABAM M : W 7→ M and and
a N XN matrix IBAM M , whose (m, w) − th element, denoted by IBAM M (m, w) is an ordered
pair in{(Um , Uw ) ∈ R2 : m ∈ M, w ∈ W and Um + Uw ≤ sm,w }, m ∈ M, w ∈ W. By
contrast, under BIM the solution to the matching game consists of only one object, namely, the
assignment ABIM : W 7→ M where ABIM is one-to-one and onto. For any couple that may
form, the utility to the man and the woman are as dictated by the primitives of the problem.
Notice that under BAMM, the splits of the marital surplus are decided in the marriage
market. These contracts are inviolable, ie, they cannot be reneged in marriage. By contrast,
under BIM, each individual, in the marriage market, correctly foresees his/her payoff in each
possible match. As mentioned before, the potential payoffs result from bargaining in marriage,
should the corresponding man-woman pair match. Most importantly, no contracts regarding
the split of marital surplus can be made in the marriage market.
If we are in a BIM environment, it is convenient to develop some further notation to denote
the utility to an individual from an assignment. For any i, i ∈ M ∪ W, we intend to have a
function that provides the utility received by i under any given assignment A. This is accomplished by defining Uei : A 7→ R+ , where
A = {A|A : W 7→ M} and Uei satisfies the following property:
M
1. For any A ∈ A, m ∈ M and the ordered pair (w, m) ∈ A, Uf
m (A) = um,w;BIM

fw (A) = uW
2. For any A ∈ A, w ∈ W and the ordered pair (w, m) ∈ A, U
m,w;BIM .
Notice that Uei (A) is the utility of individual i under assignment A. As is standard, in this basic
framework, there are no externalities between matched couples.
It is worth emphasizing that under our set-up, both the matching and the split of the surplus
accruing to each spouse in the second stage are determined in the first stage. Nonetheless, the
1

Since we have normalized the utility surplus from non-marriage to zero and assumed that each marriage
produces a positive surplus, all individuals would marry under any reasonable solution concept in our setting.
Also, we exclude polygamy by assumption.
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second stage of the game is not superfluous. In other words, we cannot reduce the game we
have described to a one-shot game, like the prisoners’ dilemma, for example. The difference
between a one-shot game, like the prisoners’ dilemma and the current set-up is as follows: In a
prisoners’ dilemma, the prisoners are matched. By contrast, under the current set-up, the payoff
matrix in the second stage is sensitive to the matching that occurs in the first stage.
Finally, we note that while the Gale-Shapley algorithm is usually used in a non-transferable
utility framework, it can easily be adapted for use in a transferable utility setting in a Bargaining
in Marriage (BIM) set-up. In doing so, we follow Pollak (2019), who points out that the
anticipated outcome of bargaining provides the utility that agents foresee arising from different
marriages. These numbers can be used to derive a ranking of potential partners, which are the
primitives required to run the Gale-Shapley algorithm.

3.3

Marriage Market Equilibrium: Alternative Criteria and
Welfare Implications

With a view to exploring the nature of the marriage market equilibrium under Binding Agreements in the Marriage Market(BAMM) and Bargaining in Marriage(BIM), we first introduce a
few possible characteristics of an equilibrium assignment:
1. Stability: In a BIM setting, an assignment ABIM is said to be stable if there does not
W
exist a pair (w, m), w ∈ W, m ∈ M such that ABIM (w) 6= m, uW
m,w > uABIM (w),w
M
and uM
m,w > um,A−1

BIM (m)

. Analogously, in a BAMM setting, an assignment ABAM M

and associated imputations of utility IBAM M (m, w) = (u∗m (m, w), u∗w (m, w)), m ∈ M,
w ∈ W, is said to be stable if there does not exist a pair (w0 , m0 ), w0 ∈ W, m0 ∈ M
such that ABAM M (w0 ) 6= m0 , u∗w0 (m0 , w0 ) > u∗w0 (ABAM M (w0 ), w0 ) and u∗m0 (m0 , w0 ) >
0
u∗m0 (m0 , A−1
BAM M (m )).

2. Woman-Pareto Optimality: In a BIM setting, an assignment A is said to be woman
ew (A0 ) ≥
Pareto optimal if there does not exist another assignment A0 ∈ A such that U
ew (A) ∀w ∈ W and there is at least one w0 ∈ W such that U
ew0 (A0 ) > U
ew0 (A). Similarly,
U
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one can define a man Pareto optimal assignment2 .
3. Utilitarian Optimality: In a BIM setting, an assignment ABIM is said to satisfy utilitarian optimality if it is an assignment that a utilitarian social planner would choose,
P

em (A0 ) + P
ew (A0 ) . Analogously, in a BAMM
ie, ABIM ∈ arg max
U
U
m∈M
w∈W
A0 ∈A

setting, an assignment ABAM M is said to satisfy utilitarian optimality if ABAM M ∈


P
arg max
sm,w .
A0 ∈A

{(w,m):A0 (w)=m}

It is well-known that with transferable utility and BAMM, stability is equivalent to utilitarian optimality (see Koopmans & Beckmann (1957), Shapley & Shubik (1971)). On the
other hand, a stable assignment under BIM, which may be found by using the Gale-Shapley
algorithm, is not utilitarian optimal in general (see Pollak (2019)). As mentioned before, we
will implement the utilitarian efficient assignment in a BIM setting using the top trading cycles algorithm. To ensure comparability, we will restrict our attention to the woman-proposing
Gale-Shapley algorithm and the “ woman-choosing” top trading cycles algorithm. The two
alternative matching algorithms are described below.
The woman-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm proceeds as follows: In the first round, each
woman proposes to her favorite man. Each man tentatively accepts (ie, “dates”) the woman that
he prefers most amongst the women who have proposed to him. He rejects all other proposals.
In any subsequent round, each woman who is not currently “dating” a man proposes to her most
preferred man from amongst the set of men have not rejected her at any previous round. If a
man prefers his current partner to all the proposals he receives in the current round, he rejects all
proposals and continues “dating” his existing partner. On the other hand, if a woman who has
proposed to a man is more attractive to him than his current partner, he ends his “engagement”
with his current partner and starts “dating” the most preferred woman who proposed to him in
the current round. He rejects all other proposals. The algorithm stops when there are no more
rejections by men.
The “ woman-choosing” top trading cycles algorithm proceeds as follows. In the first
step, each man points to his favorite woman and each woman points to her favorite man.
If (m1 , w1 , m2 , w2 , ..., mk , wk ) form a cycle, each woman pairs with the man she points to.
2

We do not need to define Pareto optimality for a BAMM setting.
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Matched men and women are removed and the algorithm proceeds until everyone is matched.
As originally shown by Gale & Shapley (1962), the Gale-Shapley algorithm produces a
stable match. On the other hand, the top trading cycles algorithm produces a woman-Pareto
optimal assignment, ie, an assignment of men to women such that by changing the assignment,
no woman can be made better off without making at least one other woman worse off. The
Gale-Shapley assignment is not necessarily woman-Pareto optimal while the top trading cycles
assignment is not necessarily stable (see Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez (2003) for an illustration).
A matching mechanism is said to be strategy proof if it is a dominant strategy for all
agents to reveal their true preferences under that mechanism. Since the woman-proposing GaleShapley mechanism is woman-optimal, it is a dominant strategy for each woman to state her
true preferences (see Roth & Sotomayor (1990), Theorem 4.7, page 90). However, with strict
preferences, whenever more than one stable assignment exists, there will always be an incentive for some man to misrepresent his preferences under the woman-proposing Gale-Shapley
algorithm (see Roth & Sotomayor (1990), Corollary 4.12, page 96). A similar result applies to
the top trading cycles algorithm. Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez (2003)3 prove that the top trading
cycles mechanism is strategy proof for women while the example in our Appendix B shows
that it is not strategy proof for men.

3.4

Implementing the BAMM Assignment in a BIM Framework

Proposition 1 below provides a sufficient condition under which the BAMM assignment may
coincide with the assignment under BIM with top-trading cycles. In order to state Proposition
1, we must first introduce some notation and establish a lemma.
P
ei (A)}
For J = M, W, define UJ = {u ∈ R : ∃ A ∈ A s.t. u = i∈J U
P
ei (A) and A∗ = arg max P
e
UJ∗ := max i∈J U
J
i∈J Ui (A), .
A∈A

In words,

A∈A

A∗J

is the set of assignments, each element of which maximizes the sum of utilities

of all individuals belonging to set J .
3

See their Proposition 4, pg. 738

72

∗,(−1)

UJ

:= max ∗

A∈A\AJ

P

i∈J

ei (A),
U

J = M, W

In words, if the unique values of the sum of utilities (over all possible assignments) of individ∗,(−1)

uals in set J (to members of the opposite sex) were to be ranked in descending order, UJ
would be the second element.
Further, define CONDITION A as follows:
∗,(−1)

∗
CONDITION A: UW
− UW

∗
> UM
, and A∗W is a singleton.

With a view toward understanding the condition intuitively, let us define the first-best assignment for any gender as the assignment that maximizes the sum of utilities of all members
of that gender across all possible assignments. Then, CONDITION A translates into the requirement that the first-best assignment for men entail a lower total utility (to men) than the difference in utility (to women) between the first-best and the second-best assignment for women.
Since we have normalized the utility of non-marriage to zero, CONDITION A implies that
men, as a group, are less sensitive to marriage than women. Also, note that CONDITION
A is a cardinal property, ie, whether it holds depends on the choice or cardinalization of the
utility function representing preferences. Given underlying preference orderings over private
and public consumption goods in marriage, it has to hold for a well-chosen cardinalization of
utility such that the Pareto frontier is a hyperplane as in (3.1).
As an illustration of CONDITION A, consider the following example.

Example 1
An economy consists of three men and three women with the following preferences4 Suppose
the utilities from different assignments are given by
Table 3.1: Example Illustrating Condition A

Man 1
Man 2
Man 3

Woman 1 Woman 2 Woman 3
(1,5)
(0,10)
(0.5,1)
(0.5,10)
(1,5)
(0,0.5)
(0.5,2)
(1,2)
(0,0)

4

The preference ordering in this example is a slight alteration of Example 1 in Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez
(2003), pg. 736. Cardinal utility values consistent with the ordering have been added by us.
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In Table 3.1 above, the entry in the cell with index (i, j) is the ordered pair (Uij , Uji ) where
Uij denotes the utility of man i if he were to marry woman j and Uji denotes the utility of woman
j if she were to marry man i.
It is easy to check that CONDITION A holds in the example above (see Appendix C).
As stated earlier, CONDITION A requires that the loss in total utility to women by moving from the assignment that is first-best for women to the assignment that is second-best for
women exceed the total utility (to men) of the first-best assignment for men. Thus, it seems
intuitive that this requirement implies that the assignment that is first-best for women also maximizes the total utility of all individuals (of both sexes). This is formally demonstrated in the
lemma below.

Lemma 1
If CONDITION A holds, A∗ ∈ A∗W =⇒ A∗ ∈ arg max
A∈A

P

m∈M

e
em (A) + P
U
w∈W Uw (A)



Proof: See Appendix D.

Proposition 1
If the top-trading cycles algorithm produces an assignment A∗ ∈ A∗W and CONDITION A
holds, then the assignment under top-trading cycles coincides with an equilibrium BAMM
assignment.
Proof : See Appendix E.
As an illustration of the proposition above, note that in Example 1 the man-pointing, womanchoosing top trading cycles algorithm converges to the following assignment.

M1 → W2 ,

M2 → W1 ,

M3 → W3

(3.2)

By part 1 of Proposition 1, (3.2) is also the equilibrium assignment under BAMM.
The woman-proposing variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm converges to the unique stable
assignment, which is the following:
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M1 → W1 ,

M2 → W2 ,

M3 → W3

(3.3)

Notice that assignments (3.2) and (3.3) are distinct. Thus, A∗ is not stable in general.
Note that Proposition 1 requires that the top trading cycles assignment coincide with an
element in A∗W . While that may be the case, it is not guaranteed to happen. In particular, the
top trading cycles algorithm can converge to an assignment that is Pareto optimal but does not
belong to A∗W . As an illustration of this consider the following simple example.

Example 2
Suppose there are two individuals of each gender in the economy and their utilities from alternative assignments are as shown in Table 3.2 below:
Table 3.2: Example Illustrating that the TTC algorithm is not Utilitarian Efficient in general

Man 1
Man 2

Woman 1 Woman 2
(0,10)
(1,5)
(0,0)
(1,0)

If we run the top trading cycles, in the first step both women point at man 1. Both men
point at woman 2. Man 1 and woman 2 form the only cycle, so they match. In the next step
man 2 matches with woman 1. Thus the top trading cycles algorithm produces the following
assignment.

W1 → M2 ,

W2 → M1

(3.4)

Notice that assignment (3.4) yields a total utility of 6, which is lower than the total utility
of 11 yielded by assignment (3.5) below

W1 → M1 ,

W2 → M2

(3.5)

Hence, assignment (3.5) is the unique BAMM assignment in this economy, and the top trading
cycles algorithm reaches a different assignment.
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Since our interest lies in implementing the BAMM assignment, that leaves open the issue
as to whether there are conditions on preferences under which the top trading cycles algorithm
or some variant thereof can implement the BAMM assignment.

Example 2 above illustrates why the top trading cycles algorithm may fail to converge to
the BAMM assignment. If the preferences of men are such that they prefer women who lose
lower amounts of utility when they are matched with a lower ranked partner as opposed to
women who lose higher amounts of utility when forced to make the corresponding change in
respect to their partner, the assignment resulting from the top trading cycles is different from
the BAMM assignment. In order to ensure that the top trading cycles implements the BAMM
assignment, we need to make more assumptions on preferences. To that end, we first introduce
a definition.
Definition:
Woman i is more sensitive than woman i0 if and only if the following holds:
(N )
(1) 
(j)
(j+1)
∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., N − 1}
− Uei > N. Uei0 − Uei0
Uei
ei (A)} and Ue(j) denotes the j-th order statistic of Uei .
where Uei := {u ∈ R+ |∃A ∈ A s.t.u = U
i
In words, if a more “sensitive” woman were to be matched with a partner one rank below
rather than with a partner of the rank (according to her ordering) under consideration, she would
lose more utility than all “less” sensitive woman could gain by switching from her worst partner
to her best partner.
We assume that women can be ranked by order of sensitivity. We state this formally in
Assumption 15 below.
Assumption 1: Sensitivity
The following statements hold:
1. min Uei = C,

C ∈ R+

∀i ∈ W

2. i is more sensitive than i + 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, i ∈ W

5

These are not the weakest possible assumptions that implement the utilitarian efficient assignment, but weaker
assumptions are more complicated.
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Assumption 2: Hierarchy
1. There exist a finite number of groups labeled 1, 2, .., K, where K ≤ N , ranked hierarchically; group 1 being the highest and group K being the lowest. Formally, let the family
of sets P1 , P2 , ..., PK be a partition of the set of all agents in the game, i.e., M ∪ W.
2. There are an equal number of men and women in each set Pk , k = 1, 2, ..., K.
3. Given w1 , w2 ∈ W, if w1 is more sensitive than w2 , w1 is in the same level as w2 or at a
higher level than w2 .
4. For men and women in a group k, k < K, the following holds: For each woman(man),
there is a distinct man(woman) in her(his) level whom she(he) strictly prefers to all other
men(women) in her(his) level or below her(his) level. For men and women in a group
k > 1, the following holds: Each woman(man) strictly prefers any man(woman) above
her(his) level to any man(woman) in her(his) level.
One can think of at least two real-world scenarios in which it is plausible that Assumption 2
holds. The first is a school assignment context where a school may have a priority for students
who live in the attendance area of the school, or has siblings attending the same school (see
Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez (2003)). The second example, and the one that is more closely
related to the current context, is the Indian marriage market, where there are quite a few castes
ranked hierarchically (see Anderson (2003)). Interestingly, Anderson (2003) uses a quality-ofgroom (as perceived by the bride) function which is such that a bride prefers grooms of a higher
caste to those of a lower caste. Such a quality-of-groom function is consistent with Assumption
2.
We are now in a position to state the central proposition in this paper.

Proposition 2
If Condition A, Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, the top trading cycles algorithm produces
the BAMM assignment.
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Proof : See Appendix F.

As an illustration of Proposition 2, consider the following example6 :

Example 3
There are three women and three men with preference orderings given below.
m1 : w1  w3  w2
m2 : w2  w1  w3
m3 : w2  w1  w3

w1 : m2  m1  m3
w2 : m1  m2  m3
w3 : m1  m2  m3
There are two levels in society, ie K = 2. Level 1 consists of {m1 , m2 , w1 , w2 } and level two
consists of {m3 , w3 }. Notice that this preference ordering satisfies Assumption 2 if we further
assume w1 is more sensitive than w2 , who is more sensitive than w3 . To see this, observe that
the most preferred woman for m1 and m2 are both from level 1. The same holds for w1 and w2 .
Further, w3 is m3 ’s worst choice. Similarly, m3 is w3 ’s worst choice.
The top trading cycles algorithm on this particular preference ordering proceeds as follows:
At Step 1, there is exactly one cycle, which is the following: (w1 , m2 , w2 , m1 ). Notice that this
cycle is nested within level 1. Further, all members from level 2, ie m3 and w3 point to some
member in level 1, but neither m3 nor w3 is part of any cycle. At Step 1, w1 is matched with
m2 and w2 is matched with m1 . At Step 2 of the algorithm the only cycle is (m3 , w3 ). Thus,
m3 and w3 are paired at Step 2 of the algorithm, and the algorithm terminates.
While the matching produced by the top trading cycles algorithm is woman Pareto optimal,
it is not stable. For example, m1 prefers w3 over his current match and w3 prefers m1 over her
current match. Two aspects of the matching produced by the top trading cycles algorithm are
worth emphasizing. First, all matches are nested within levels. This is consistent with caste
6

The example is adapted from Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez (2003), Example 1, Pg. 736
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endogamy observed in the Indian marriage market. Second, given the assignment produced by
the top trading cycles, the profitable bilateral deviation is between the two levels, not within a
given level. This is a result that holds generally. The proposition below states this formally.

Proposition 3
If Assumption 2 holds, all bilaterally profitable deviations from the matching produced by the
top trading cycles are across levels.
Proof : See Appendix G.

The fact that bilaterally profitable deviations are across levels has the following interpretation in the Indian marriage context: If the marriage matching process in society produces a
utilitarian efficient matching, individuals may have an incentive to deviate from the efficient
matching. To prevent those one would need strict social norms, for example, brutal punishments to couples who bilaterally deviate. However, these punishments would not be necessary
if the matching produced were stable. Thus, the existence of costly-to-implement social sanctions against inter-caste marriages is consistent with our framework, but cannot be rationalized
if the marriage matching in the Indian market were to be thought of as being produced by the
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
We now provide a partial converse to Proposition 1. To that end, define CONDITION B as
follows:
∗
CONDITION B: UW
−

P

w∈W

ew (A∗ ) > U ∗ , A∗ is a singleton, and A∗ ∩ A∗ = ∅.
U
W
M
W
M
M

In words, CONDITION B requires that the total loss in utility to women by moving from
the assignment that is first-best for women to the assignment that is first-best for men exceed the
total utility to all men from the assignment that is first-best for men. If we assume A∗M ∩ A∗W =
∅, CONDITION A =⇒ CONDITION B To see why this is true, assume that A∗M ∩ A∗W = ∅
P
∗,(−1)
ew (A∗ ). Hence,
and CONDITION A holds. So, UW
≥ w∈W U
M
P
∗,(−1)
∗
∗
∗
ew (A∗ ) > U ∗
UW
− UW
> UM
=⇒ UW
− w∈W U
M
M
Hence, A∗M ∩ A∗W = ∅ and CONDITION A =⇒ CONDITION B. Before we introduce the
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next proposition, we need to develop some notation. Denote by A∗T T C the assignment that the
top trading cycles algorithm produces.

Proposition 4
If A∗BAM M = A∗T T C = A∗W , A∗M ∩A∗BAM M = ∅ and A∗BAM M is a singleton, then CONDITION
B holds.
Proof: See Appendix H

Next, we illustrate through an example that Assumption 2 is necessary for implementing the
utilitarian efficient matching through the top trading cycles algorithm. Consider the example
below:

Example 4
Table 3.3: Example that Assumption 2 is necessary for implementing the utilitarian efficient
matching through the TTC algorithm

Man 1
Man 2
Man 3

Woman 1 Woman 2 Woman 3
(5,500)
(0.1,25)
(1,6)
(1,1000)
(5,50)
(0.1,5)
(1,0.1)
(5,0.1)
(0.1,0.1)

In Table 3.3 above, the entry in the cell with index (i, j) is the ordered pair (Uij , Uji ) where
Uij denotes the utility of man i if he were to marry woman j and Uji denotes the utility of
woman j if she were to marry man i. Note that in the example above, the preference ordering
satisfies CONDITION A and Assumption 1, but fails to satisfy Assumption 2 (see Appendix I
for details). Further, as we show in Appendix I, the top trading cycles algorithm produces the
following assignment:

W1 → M1 ,

W2 → M2 ,

W3 → M3

The assignment above results in a total utility of 560.2 to all agents, which is lower than
1026.3 produced by the following assignment:
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W1 → M2 ,

W2 → M1 ,

W3 → M3

Hence, in the example above, the top trading cycles algorithm does not result in a utilitarian
efficient assignment/matching.

Finally, note that in the “unusual” case where a stable assignment is also Pareto optimal, the
equilibrium under BIM with the Gale-Shapley algorithm could coincide with the equilibrium
with the top-trading cycles algorithm. This equilibrium could be distinct from the equilibrium
under BAMM. As an illustration, consider the following example7 .

Example 5
Suppose the economy consists of two men and two women whose preferences can be represented by the cardinal utility shown in Table 3.4 below.
Table 3.4: Example illustrating that the stable matching may be Pareto optimal

Man 1
Man 2

Woman 1 Woman 2
(11,1)
(2,2)
(2,2)
(0,0)

The equilibrium BAMM assignment is the following:

M1 → W1 ,

M2 → W2

(3.6)

Irrespective of whether one uses the top trading cycles algorithm or the Gale-Shapley algorithm, the BIM assignment is the following:

M1 → W2 ,

M2 → W1

Note that assignments (3.6) and (3.7) are distinct.
7

The example is a slight modification of the example in Pollak (2019), pg 23.
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(3.7)

3.5

Conclusion

The set of stable marriage matches, and their welfare implications, are different depending
on whether allocation within marriage is determined by binding agreements in the marriage
market (BAMM) or by bargaining in marriage (BIM) with no commitment. With transferable
utility, any stable matching is utilitarian efficient under BAMM. This, however, does not hold
under BIM, which appears to be a more (empirically) plausible assumption than BAMM. In
this paper we showed that it is possible to implement the utilitarian efficient matching even
in a BIM setting. If agents on one side of the market are sufficiently sensitive to matches
relative to the other side, the more sensitive side can be ranked by sensitivity, and preferences
over members of the opposite sex are hierarchical, the top trading cycles algorithm results in a
utilitarian efficient matching.
Given that the assignments produced by using the alternative algorithms of Gale-Shapley
and top trading cycles under BIM could be different, it is of great interest to examine the
empirical evidence on which algorithm better represents the real world marriage market. After
all, these algorithms are not meant to serve as literal descriptions of the matching process, but
rather as constructive proofs of the existence of a matching with desirable properties — stability
in the case of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and Pareto efficiency in the case of the top trading
cycles algorithm. Thus, the choice of one matching algorithm over the other should not be
based on the consideration as to whether one provides a better literal description of marriage
matching but on whether one algorithm is better able to rationalize the data as compared to the
other. However, this question has hardly been addressed in the literature.
There are only a few empirical papers dealing with marriage-matching in a non-transferable
utility setting that use the Gale-Shapley algorithm. For instance, Hitsch et al. (2010) estimate
mate preferences from matches observed on a dating site. Then they use the Gale-Shapley
algorithm to predict matches on the dating site and do fairly well. They also attempt to use
the estimated preferences to predict matches in the real world, again using the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. In the real world, the Gale-Shapley algorithm underpredicts assortative matching on
several dimensions. Lee (2009) performs a similar exercise using data from an online matchmaking platform in South Korea. In her exercise, she estimates preferences with matchmaker
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data, and the Gale-Shapley algorithm does a fair job of predicting matches amongst users of
online services. Gale-Shapley predictions, however, are somewhat off in terms of predicting
matches in the real world. Banerjee et al. (2013) use data on matches in the marriage market
from India to estimate preferences for partner attributes, most notably for caste of the partner.
They use their estimated preferences to simulate matches using the Gale-Shapley algorithm to
clear the marriage market. While moments from their simulated data match data fit real world
matches on several dimensions, their simulations overpredict (by a substantial margin) caste
homogamy relative to that in the data.
In summary, the Gale-Shapley algorithm does not do a stellar job in predicting matches
in the real world. Further, while there is sufficient evidence to suggest that BIM, rather than
BAMM, is an appropriate framework to model ongoing marriages, there are, to the best of
our knowledge, no empirical studies that investigate whether the marriage market equilibrium
in the real world is substantially different from the BAMM equilibrium. Moreover, social
norms governing marriage and courtship vary widely across the world, and there may exist
social norms that violate stability. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, men routinely kidnap women,
often without their consent, for marriage (see Kleinbach et al. (2005), Handrahan (2004) and
Nedoluzhko & Agadjanian (2015)). In India, caste endogamy and clan exogamy are widely
prevalent. It is possible that social norms relating to endogamy and exogamy serve to facilitate
efficient matches even though these matches may not be stable. Further, the fact that they are
often enforced by brutal social punishments to couples that deviate could be on account of the
fact that the utilitarian efficient matching is not robust to bilateral deviation. In all these cases,
the top trading cycles algorithm, which results in an assignment that is Pareto optimal, could be
a better predictor of matches in the real world than the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which results
in an assignment that is stable. In future research, we intend to estimate models using the top
trading cycles algorithm instead of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, for example, with the data in
the studies cited above.
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Appendix
A

Divorce and Property Division Law Reforms in the sample
period
Table A1: Divorce and Property Division Law Reforms in the sample period
State

Unilateral Equitable
State
Unilateral
divorce
division
divorce
Alabama
1971
1984
Montana
1973
Alaska
pre-1967
pre-1967
Nebraska
1972
Nevada
1967
Arizona
1973
community
Arkansas
no
1977
New Hampshire
1971
New Jersey
no
California
1970
community
Colorado
1972
1972
New Mexico
pre-1967
Connecticut
1973
1973
New York
no
North Carolina
no
Delaware
1968
pre-1967
District of Columbia
no
1977
North Dakota
1971
Ohio
1992
Florida
1971
1980
Georgia
1973
1984
Oklahoma
pre-1967
Hawaii
1972
pre-1967
Oregon
1971
Pennsylvania
no
Idaho
1971
community
Rhode Island
1975
Illinois
no
1977
Indiana
1973
pre-1967
South Carolina
no
South Dakota
1985
Iowa
1970
pre-1967
Tennessee
no
Kansas
1969
pre-1967
Kentucky
1972
1976
Texas
1970
Utah
1987
Louisiana
no
community
Vermont
no
Maine
1973
1972
Maryland
no
1978
Virginia
no
Washington
1973
Massachusetts
1975
1974
Michigan
1972
pre-1967
West Virginia
1984
Minnesota
1974
pre-1967
Wisconsin
1978
Mississippi
no
1989
Wyoming
1977
Missouri
no
1977
Note: Data from Voena (2015), Online Appendix, Table F.1
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Equitable
division
1976
1972
community
1977
1974
community
1980
1981
pre-1967
1981
1975
1971
1980
1981
1985
pre-1967
pre-1967
community
pre-1967
pre-1967
1982
community
1985
community(1986)
pre-1967

B

Example: Top Trading Cycles is not strategy-proof for
men

The example below illustrates that top trading cycles algorithm is not strategy proof for men.
Suppose there are three men and three women and that their true preferences are as follows:
m1 : w1  w3  w2
m2 : w2  w1  w3
m3 : w2  w1  w3

w1 : m2  m1  m3
w2 : m1  m2  m3
w3 : m1  m2  m3
If everyone reveals her/his true preference, the top trading cycles mechanism converges to the
following assignment:
m1 → w2 ,

m2 → w1 ,

m3 → w3

Notice that man 1 is matched with the woman ranked lowest according to his preference ordering.
Suppose man 1, instead of revealing his true preferences, reveals the following: mf1 alse :
w3  w1  w2 .
Suppose further that all other individuals in the economy state their true preferences. In this
case the top trading cysles mechanism converges to the following assignment.
m1 → w3 ,

m2 → w2 ,

m3 → w1

Notice that man 1 is now matched with the woman ranked second according to his true preference ordering. Thus, truth-telling is not a dominant strategy for man 1.

C

Example 1 satisfies CONDITION A
∗,(−1)

∗
∗
Here, UM
= 2, UW
= 20, UW
∗,(−1)

∗
∴ UW
− UW

= 13

∗
= 7 > 2 = UM
.
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Table C1: Tabulation of sum of Utilities from all Possible Assignments
P
P
(m, w) pairs
U
m
m∈M
w∈W Uw
(1,1), (2,2), (3,3)
2
10
(1,2), (2,3), (3,1)
0.5
12.5
(1,3), (2,1), (3,2)
2
13
(1,1), (2,3), (3,2)
2
7.5
(1,2), (2,1), (3,3)
0.5
20
(1,3), (2,2), (3,1)
2
8
Maximum
2
20
Hence, CONDITION A holds.

D

Proof of Lemma 1

/ arg max
Suppose CONDITION A holds, A∗ ∈ A∗W but A∗ ∈

P

A∈A

m∈M


e
em (A)+P
U
w∈W Uw (A) .

Then, ∃ A0 ∈ A, A0 6= A∗ such that

P

m∈M

=⇒


 P
P
∗
∗
0
e
e
e
em (A0 ) + P
U
w∈W Uw (A )
m∈M Um (A ) +
w∈W Uw (A ) >

P

m∈M


 P
∗
∗
0
e
e
em (A0 ) + P
U
m∈M Um (A ) + UW
w∈W Uw (A ) >



∵ A∗ ∈ A∗W



Rearranging the above inequality and applying CONDITION A, we have
 X

em (A0 ) −
U

m∈M

X

X

 
em (A∗ ) > U ∗ −
ew (A0 ) ≥ U ∗ − U ∗,(−1) > U ∗
U
U
W
W
M
W

But

∗
UM
≥

X
m∈M

(D1)

w∈W

m∈M

em (A0 ) ≥
U

 X

em (A0 ) −
U

m∈M

X
m∈M

∗
∗
From (D1) and (D2), UM
> UM
which is a contradiction.
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em (A∗ )
U

∀A0 ∈ A

(D2)

E

Proof of Proposition 1

Suppose the top-trading cycles algorithm produces an element A∗ ∈ A∗W and CONDITION A
holds. With transferable utility, the set of equilibrium assignments under BAMM is given by
P

P
e
e
A∗BAM M = {A ∈ A : A ∈ arg max
m∈M Um (A) +
w∈W Uw (A) }. Thus, if CONDIA∈A

TION A is true, from Lemma 1 we conclude that A∗ ∈ A∗BAM M . 

F

Proof of Proposition 2

Step 1
Definition: Nested Cycle
A cycle C = (m1 , w1 , ...., mn , wn ) is nested within level k, k ≤ K if and only if for any j,
j = 1, 2, ..., n, such that mj , wj ∈ C, mj and wj are both in level k.
Claim: At Step 1 of the TTC, all cycles are nested within the top level,
ie, level 1.
Proof :
Suppose not. Then there is at least one cycle not nested within level 1. First, notice that all
individuals below level 1 are pointing at someone in level 1. So any cycle has to include at
least one person from level 1. Suppose such a cycle is not nested within level 1. Then there
is at least one man or woman in level 1 who is pointing at a woman or man at level k, k > 1.
But that implies she or he prefers a partner below her or his level to all partners at her/his level,
which violates Assumption 2.

Step 2
Claim: Each man and woman in level 1 is part of some cycle at Step 1 of the top trading cycles
(TTC).
Proof :
Suppose there are some women and men in level 1 who are not part of any cycle at Step 1.
Note that there is at least one cycle. Since each man and woman has a unique and distinct most
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preferred mate, no individual who does not belong to any cycle is pointing to any individual
who is part of a cycle. Further, there are as many men as women who do not belong to any cycle.
Let each man point to his most preferred woman and each woman point to her most preferred
man. Let such men and women form the following ordered list: (mc1 , w1c , ...., mcl , wlc ). Then, wlc
must be pointing back at some man in the ordered list, thus forming a cycle, and contradicting
the initial claim that no man or woman in (mc1 , w1c , ...., mcl , wlc ) belongs to a cycle.

Step 3
Claim: Each man and woman in level 1 is matched at Step 1 of the TTC.
Proof :
From Step 2 of this proof, each man and each woman at level 1 is part of some cycle. By
construction of the TTC, each woman is matched with the man she points to at Step 1 of the
TTC. Hence, each man and woman in level 1 is matched at Step 1 of the TTC.

Step 4
Claim: At any subsequent Step k of the TTC, all cycles are nested within level k. All individuals
at level k are matched in Step k.
Proof :
By induction on k.
Suppose the statement is true for some k = m, m ≤ K − 1. We will show that the statement is
true for k = m + 1. Note that by Step m + 1 of the TTC, all individuals at or above level m are
already matched. (This holds by the induction hypothesis.) By the same argument as in Step 1
of this proof, all cycles at Step m + 1 of the TTC are nested within level m + 1. By the same
argument as in Step 2 of this proof, each man and woman at level m + 1 is part of some cycle
at Step m + 1 of the TTC, and are, therefore, matched at Step m + 1 of the TTC.
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Step 5
Claim: The top trading cycles algorithm produces a matching A∗ where A∗ is given by:
A∗ (w1 ) = mj s.t. Uw1 (mj ) = max{Uw1 (m1 ), Uw1 (m2 ), ...., Uw1 (mN )}
For j = {2, 3, ..., N }, A∗ (wj ) = ml
n
s.t. Uwj (ml ) = max {Uwj (m1 ), Uwj (m2 ), ...., Uwj (mN )}\

∪

i=1,..,j−1

o
A(wi )

Proof :
Consider women at level 1, ie w1 , .., wK1 . Each woman at level 1 has a unique and distinct most
preferred man. Thus, m∗l 6= m∗l0 ∀ l 6= l0 , wl , wl0 ∈ level 1, where
m∗l := argmax{Uwl (m1 ), Uwl (m2 ), ...., Uwl (mN )}
Hence, for all women at level 1, A∗ satisfies the following property:
A∗ (w1 ) = mj s.t. Uw1 (mj ) = max{Uw1 (m1 ), Uw1 (m2 ), ...., Uw1 (mN )}, and
for j = {2, 3, ..., K1 }, A∗ (wj ) = m∗l
n
s.t. Uwj (m∗l ) = max {Uwj (m1 ), Uwj (m2 ), ...., Uwj (mN )}\

∪

i=1,..,j−1

o
A(wi )

All men and women at level 1 are matched in Step 1 of the TTC. Thus, when the TTC
proceeds to Step 2, the most preferred men of all women at level 2 have already been eliminated
at Step 1 of the TTC. Thus, each woman at level 2 has a unique and distinct most preferred man
from amongst the set of unmatched men. Hence, the argument in the above paragraph can be
applied repeatedly to establish the claim. 

Step 6
Claim: A∗ is woman-Pareto optimal.
Proof :
ew (A0 ) ≥
Suppose A∗ is not woman-Pareto optimal. Then ∃ an assignment A0 6= A∗ such that U
i
n
ew (A∗ ) ∀wi ∈ W and ∃ wi0 ∈ W such that U
ew 0 (A0 ) > U
ew 0 (A∗ ). Define i0 := min i0 ∈
U
i
min
i
i
o
ew 0 (A0 ) > U
ew 0 (A∗ ) . By definition, A∗ assigns w1 to her most preferred man.
{1, 2, ..., N }|U
i
i
Hence, i0min 6= 1. Further, by construction of A∗ , the following holds: If the preference of wi0min
clashes with the preference of a woman with a higher index, wi0min ’s preferences are given
priority. Since preferences over men are strict, it follows that if assignment A0 matches wi0min
with the partner that some woman with a higher index had under assignment A∗ , wi0min would
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be worse off under assignment A0 than under assignment A∗ . But that cannot be the case since
that would violate the definition of i0min . Formally, @ i, i ≥ i0min , such that
A0 (wi0min ) = A∗ (wi ). So, wi0min ’s partner under A0 must have been the partner of a woman with a
lower index under A∗ . Formally, ∃ wi ∈ W, i ∈ {2, ..., i0min − 1} such that A0 (wi0min ) = A∗ (wi ).
But then A0 must match wi with a man who, under A∗ , was the partner of a woman with an
index (weakly) higher than i0min . So it must be the case that A0 (wi ) = A∗ (wei ) where ei ∈
{i0min , ..., N }. However, by construction of A∗ , Uwi (A∗ (wi )) > Uwi (A∗ (wei )) = Uwi (A0 (wi ))
ew (A0 ) < U
ew (A∗ ) which contradicts the definition of A0 . 
=⇒ U
i
i

Step 7
A ∈ A∗W =⇒ A is woman-Pareto optimal
Proof :
Suppose A is not woman Pareto optimal. Then there is an assignment A0 6= A such that
ew 0 (A0 ) > U
ew 0 (A).
ew (A) ∀wi ∈ W and ∃ wi0 ∈ W such that U
ew (A0 ) ≥ U
U
i
i
i
i
ew (A0 ) > U
ew (A)}.
Let Wb := {w ∈ W|U
P
P
P
P
0
0
0
e
e
e
e
w∈W Uw (A ) =
w∈Wb Uw (A ) +
w∈W\Wb Uw (A ) >
w∈W Uw (A).
Hence, A ∈
/ A∗W . 

Step 8
Claim: If Assumption 1 holds, A∗ is the unique element in A∗W .
Proof :
From Step 7 above, it suffices to demonstrate that

P

0
ew (A∗ ) > P
e
U
w∈W
w∈W Uw (A ) where

A0 6= A∗ and A0 is an arbitrary woman Pareto optimal assignment.
Suppose A0 6= A∗ and A0 is an arbitrary woman Pareto optimal assignment. Define the set
ew (A0 ) < U
ew (A∗ )} and the set of gainers G := {w ∈ W|U
ew (A0 ) >
of losers L := {w ∈ W|U
ew (A∗ )}
U
n
o
n
:= min i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }|wi ∈ I and Imax := max i ∈

For I = L, G, define Imin
o
{1, 2, ..., N }|wi ∈ I . Notice, Lmin < Gmin . To see why this holds, assume, for the sake of
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contradiction, that Lmin > Gmin 8 . Note that Gmin 6= 1, because A∗ matches w1 with her most
preferred man. Further, by construction of A∗ , the following holds: Under assignment A0 , any
woman wi ∈ G would have to be matched with a man, who, under A∗ , was partnered with a
woman wi0 , where i0 < i. In particular, this holds for Gmin . Thus, ∃ i ∈ {1, .., Gmin − 1}
such that under A0 , Gmin gets i’s partner under A∗ . But then, woman i has a different partner
under A0 than under A∗ . Since preferences are strict, woman i is not indifferent between A0 and
A∗ . She has a lower index than Gmin , so wi ∈
/ G. Therefore, wi ∈ L, which contradicts the
supposition that Lmin > Gmin .
Hence, ∃ at least one woman, wLmin ∈ L, who is more sensitive (or equivalently, has a
lower index) than any woman in G.


ew (A0 ) − U
ew (A∗ ) ≤ Uew(N ) − Uew(1) ≤ Uew(NG) − Uew(1)G
Now, ∀ w ∈ G, U
min
min
where the second inequality above follows from observing the fact that any w ∈ G is weakly
less sensitive than wGmin and by applying Assumption 19 .
Hence, we have
X

ew (A0 ) − U
ew (A∗ ) ≤ |G|. Uew(N )
U
G

min

− Uew(1)G

min



< N. Uew(NG)

min

− Uew(1)G

min



(F1)

w∈G

Since Lmin < Gmin , by Assumption 1,


ew
(A∗ ) − U
(A0 ) > N. Uew(NG) − Uew(1)G
Lmin
min
min
X


ew (A∗ ) − U
ew (A0 ) > N. Uew(N ) − Uew(1)
=⇒
U
G
G


ew
U

Lmin

min

(F2)

min

w∈L

P
0
ew (A∗ ) − P
e
Now, w∈W U
w∈W Uw (A )




P
ew (A∗ ) − U
ew (A0 ) − P
ew (A0 ) − U
ew (A∗ ) .
= w∈L U
U
w∈G
P
0
ew (A∗ ) − P
e
From (F1) and (F2), w∈W U
w∈W Uw (A ) > 0 
8

Lmin = Gmin is not a possibility because the same woman cannot be both a loser and a gainer, i.e., she
cannot be in both sets L and G.
9
From Assumption 1 it follows that for any i < i0 ,
(N )
(1) 
(j+1)
(j) 
(N )
(1) 
(N )
(1) 
e
Uwi0 − Uewi0 < N1 Uewi
− Uewi < N1 Uewi − Uewi < Uewi − Uewi where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}
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Step 9
Claim: Under Assumption 1 and CONDITION A, A∗ = A∗BAM M
Proof :
From Step 8 above, A∗ is the unique element in A∗W if Assumption 1 holds. From Proposition
1, if CONDITION A holds, A∗ = A∗BAM M 

G

Proof of Proposition 3

For any level k, k ≤ K, each woman at level k gets her most preferred man within level k. So
a woman from level k is not interested in deviating to any man at level k.

H

Proof of Proposition 4

Suppose A∗BAM M = A∗T T C = A∗W and A∗BAM M is a singleton. Then,
P
P
P
∗
∗
e
e
em (A∗
+ m∈M U
UW
BAM M ) >
m∈M Um (A) ∀A 6= ABAM M .
w∈W Uw (A) +
In particular, for A = A∗M , we have
P
P
∗
∗
∗
e
em (A∗
+ m∈M U
UW
BAM M ) >
w∈W Uw (AM ) + UM
P
∗
∗
∗
ew (A∗ ) > U ∗ − P
e
=⇒ UW
− w∈W U
M
M
m∈M Um (ABAM M ) > UM
=⇒ CONDITION B.

I

Details relevant to Example 4

I1

Example 4 satisfies CONDITION A
∗,(−1)

∗
∗
Here, UM
= 10.1, UW
= 1025.1, UW
∗,(−1)

∗
∴ UW
− UW

= 1006.1

∗
= 19 > 10.1 = UM
.

Further, the matching {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 3)} uniquely maximizes
Hence, CONDITION A holds.
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P

w∈W

Uw .

Table I1: Tabulation of sum of Utilities from all Possible Assignments
P
P
(m, w) pairs
U
m
m∈M
w∈W Uw
(1,1), (2,2), (3,3)
10.1
550.1
(1,2), (2,3), (3,1)
1.2
30.1
(1,3), (2,1), (3,2)
7
1006.1
(1,1), (2,3), (3,2)
10.1
505.1
(1,2), (2,1), (3,3)
1.2
1025.1
(1,3), (2,2), (3,1)
7
56.1
Maximum
10.1
1025.1

I2

Example 4 satisfies Assumption 1

First, observe that each woman’s utility from her worst possible match is 0.1. Next, notice that
w1 is more sensitive than w2 . By moving from her first-best to her second-best match, w1 loses
500 utils while she loses 499.9 utils by moving from her second-best to her third-best. Both
these number are more than 149.7 utils10 . Note that w2 ’s gain by moving from her best to her
worst partner equals 49.9. Similarly, w2 is more sensitive than w3 . By moving from her first to
her second-best w2 loses 25 utils while she loses 24.9 utils. Both these numbers are larger than
17.7 utils, which is what w3 gains by moving from her worst to her best choice11 .

I3

Example 4 violates Assumption 2

We must show that there is no partition of M ∪ W such that the conditions of Assumption 2
are satisfied. We can consider all possible partitions of M ∪ W below. Case 1
K = 1, P1 = M ∪ W
M ∪ W does not satisfy Assumption 2. w1 and w2 both have m2 as their stated preference,
which is a violation of Assumption 2.

Case 2
K = 2. There are two sub-cases of this case.
1. Consider a partition in which w1 and w2 are at the same level and w3 is at a lower level.
Both w1 and w2 both have m2 as their stated preference, which is a violation of Assump10
11

49.9 X 3 = 149.7
5.9 X 3 = 17.7
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tion 2. To see why, notice that m2 can either belong to the same level as w2 or the lower
level. In the first case, Assumption 2 is violated because the most preferred man (in the
same level) for two women are not distinct. In the second case, Assumption 2 is violated
because the most preferred man of both w1 and w2 belong to a lower level.
2. Consider a partition in which w1 is at the highest level and w2 and w3 both belong to the
lower level. m2 can belong to the higher or to the lower level. If m2 belongs to the lower
level, m1 and m3 belong to a higher level. But w1 prefers m2 , who is at a lower level
over m1 , who is at a higher level. This is a violation of Assumption 2. Alternatively, if
m2 belongs to the higher level, m1 and m3 must belong to the lower level. Then, w3 ’s
preference ordering violates Assumption 2, because she prefers m1 , who is at a lower
level, over m2 , who is in a higher level.
Case 3
If K = 3, we might have the following sub-cases:
Sub-case 1
P1 = {w1 , m1 }, P2 = {w2 , m2 }, P3 = {w3 , m3 }
Notice, w1 prefers m2 , who is in a lower level over m1 , who is in a higher level. This is a
violation of Assumption 2.
Sub-case 2
P1 = {w1 , m1 }, P2 = {w2 , m3 }, P3 = {w3 , m2 }
Notice, w1 prefers m2 , who is in a lower level over m1 , who is in a higher level. This is a
violation of Assumption 2.
Sub-case 3
P1 = {w1 , m2 }, P2 = {w2 , m1 }, P3 = {w3 , m3 }
Notice, m1 prefers w3 , in level 3, over w2 , who is in level 2, thereby violating Assumption 2.
Sub-case 4
P1 = {w1 , m3 }, P2 = {w2 , m1 }, P3 = {w3 , m2 }
Notice, w1 prefers m2 in level 2 over m3 in level 1, thereby violating Assumption 2.
Sub-case 5
P1 = {w1 , m2 }, P2 = {w2 , m3 }, P3 = {w3 , m1 }
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Notice, w3 prefers m1 in level 3 over m3 in level 1, thus violating Assumption 2.
Sub-case 6
P1 = {w1 , m3 }, P2 = {w2 , m2 }, P3 = {w3 , m1 }
Notice, w1 prefers m2 in level 2 over m3 in level 1, thus violating Assumption 2.

I4

Top Trading Cycles (TTC) on Example 4

In Step 1 of the TTC, M2 and W2 are the only two agents that are part of a cycle. They are
matched in Step 1. The algorithm proceeds to Step 2. M1 and W1 are the only two agents that
are part of a cycle. They are matched in Step 2. In Step 3, M3 and W3 point to one another, and
are matched. Thus, the TTC algorithm produces the following assignment:

W1 → M1 ,

W2 → M2 ,
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W3 → M3

